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Now that the nightmare scenario of a close Trump loss and ensuing fight over the election has been taken off the table by a decisive Trump-led rightist sweep over Harris’s leftist alternative and a number of his key appointments have been announced, a picture of what is likely to happen is emerging. I want to make clear that the picture I am painting is meant to be as accurate as possible without any biased opinions of good or bad, because accuracy is what's most important for making decisions in the best possible way.
既然川普以決定性優勢擊敗賀錦麗所代表的左翼勢力，從而避免了川普險敗以及隨後圍繞選舉展開爭鬥這一噩夢般的情形，而且他的一些關鍵任命也已公佈，那麼一幅可能發生之事的圖景正逐漸浮現。我想明確的是，我所描繪的這幅圖景旨在儘可能做到精準無誤，不帶任何好壞方面的偏見性觀點，因為對於以最佳方式做出決策而言，精準性是最為重要的。
The picture that I see is one of 1) a giant renovation of government and the domestic order aimed at making it run more efficiently, which will include an internal political war to convert that vision into reality, and 2) an “America first” foreign policy and preparation for external war with China, which is perceived to be America’s greatest threat. The most recent analogous period is the 1930s, when such an approach emerged in several countries.
我所看到的圖景是這樣的：其一，對政府和國內秩序進行大刀闊斧的改革，旨在使其運行得更有效率，這將包括一場內部政治鬥爭，以將這一願景變為現實；其二，奉行 “美國優先” 的外交政策，並為與中國（被視為美國最大的威脅）的對外“戰爭”做準備。與之最為相似的近期時期是 20 世紀 30 年代，當時有幾個國家出現了類似的做法。
The people Donald Trump is choosing to make this happen with him are: Elon Musk and Vivek Ramaswamy, who will run the newly proposed Department of Government Efficiency; Matt Gaetz, who, as Attorney General (if he gets the Senate’s approval), will push the legal limits of what those who are running this new order can do; RFK Jr., who would radically reform the healthcare system, as Secretary of Health and Human Services; and Marco Rubio as Secretary of State, Tulsi Gabbard as Director of National Intelligence, and Pete Hegseth as Secretary of Defense, who will lead the fight against foreign adversaries. Many, many others—some who might be in government and some who will be outside advisors, like Tucker Carlson, Steve Bannon, and a few Trump family members—will be on the mission with Trump. They are all win-at-all-cost loyalists to the leader and to the mission of bringing down the so-called “deep state” and replacing it with a new domestic order that they hope will create maximum economic strength and fight foreign enemies.
唐納德・川普挑選來與他一同實現這些目標的人有：埃隆・馬斯克和維韋克・拉馬斯瓦米，他們將負責管理新提議設立的政府效率部；馬特・蓋茲，若能獲得參議院批准出任司法部長，他將突破那些推動這一新秩序之人所能採取行動的法律界限；小羅伯特・F・甘迺迪，若出任衛生與公眾服務部部長，他將對醫療保健系統進行大刀闊斧的改革；馬爾科・盧比奧出任國務卿，圖爾西・加巴德出任國家情報總監，皮特・赫格塞特出任國防部長，他們將領導對抗外國對手的鬥爭。還有很多很多其他人 —— 有些可能會進入政府任職，有些則會擔任外部顧問，比如塔克・卡爾森、史蒂夫・班農以及一些川普家族成員 —— 都將與川普一同肩負這一使命。他們都是不惜一切代價效忠於領袖以及推翻所謂 “深層政府”、代之以新的國內秩序這一使命的人，他們希望新秩序能創造出最大的經濟實力並對抗外敵。
Once these people are in place, the same appointment approach will likely be used to purge the government of those accused of being part of the “deep state,” who are not aligned with and loyal to the mission. This will extend to all parts of the government system including those that were previously thought to be less politically/ideologically controlled, such as the military, the Department of Justice, the FBI, the SEC, the Federal Reserve, the Food and Drug Administration, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of the Interior, and “Schedule F” government employees (a job classification that President-elect Trump wants to reintroduce to reclassify certain government jobs to remove civil service protections). Most all appointed positions that the president (in conjunction with the Republican-controlled Senate, House, and the Department of Justice) can control will be controlled, to have people aligned with President Trump and his new domestic order in place. In the process of doing this, most everyone in and out of government will be viewed as either an ally or an enemy, and all powers at the disposal of Donald Trump and allies will be used to beat the enemies who are standing in the way of their reforms. I think they will almost certainly have a big impact on changing the domestic and world orders. What will they look like?
一旦這些人各就各位，很可能會採用同樣的任命方式來清除政府中那些被指控為 “深層政府” 成員、與這一使命不一致且不忠誠的人。這將波及政府系統的各個部分，包括那些此前被認為在政治 / 意識形態方面受控制較少的部門，比如軍隊、司法部、聯邦調查局、證券交易委員會、聯準會、食品藥品監督管理局、疾病控制與預防中心、國土安全部、內政部以及 “F 級日程” 政府僱員（當選總統川普希望重新引入這一職務分類，以便對某些政府職位重新分類，從而取消公務員保護）。總統（與共和黨掌控的參議院、眾議院以及司法部協同）所能掌控的幾乎所有任命職位都將被掌控，以便讓與川普總統及其新的國內秩序保持一致的人就位。在這一過程中，政府內外的幾乎所有人都將被視為盟友或敵人，唐納德・川普及其盟友所能動用的一切權力都將被用來擊敗那些阻礙他們改革的敵人。我認為他們幾乎肯定會對國內和世界秩序的改變產生重大影響。那麼這些秩序會變成什麼樣呢？
It is now clear that Donald Trump and those he is choosing will reform government and the country like a corporate raider engaging in a hostile takeover of an inefficient company, making huge reforms to it by changing the people, slashing costs, and infusing it with new technologies. Think of Gordon Gekko and the perspective he conveyed in his “greed is good” speech, while recognizing that this is coming from the president of the United States, who is going to take that approach to the central government and the entire country. As mentioned, the most recent analogous historical cases were the hard-rightist states in the 1930s. To be clear, I am not saying that Trump and those in his government are fascist or will behave as fascist leaders did in many respects; what I am saying is that, in order to understand those who are now taking control with nationalistic, protectionist, top-down, government-led economic and social policies, and who have little tolerance for internal opposition and are embroiled in international great powers conflicts, it is worth understanding how those states with analogous policies in the 1930s behaved.
一旦這些人各就各位，很可能會採用同樣的任命方式來清除政府中那些被指控為 “深層政府” 成員、與這一使命不一致且不忠誠的人。這將波及政府系統的各個部分，包括那些此前被認為在政治 / 意識形態方面受控制較少的部門，比如軍隊、司法部、聯邦調查局、證券交易委員會、聯準會、食品藥品監督管理局、疾病控制與預防中心、國土安全部、內政部以及 “F 級日程” 政府僱員（當選總統川普希望重新引入這一職務分類，以便對某些政府職位重新分類，從而取消公務員保護）。總統（與共和黨掌控的參議院、眾議院以及司法部協同）所能掌控的幾乎所有任命職位都將被掌控，以便讓與川普總統及其新的國內秩序保持一致的人就位。在這一過程中，政府內外的幾乎所有人都將被視為盟友或敵人，唐納德・川普及其盟友所能動用的一切權力都將被用來擊敗那些阻礙他們改革的敵人。我認為他們幾乎肯定會對國內和世界秩序的改變產生重大影響。那麼這些秩序會變成什麼樣呢？
The economic renovation of the country will, in all likelihood, come via industrial policies that are designed to improve productivity and efficiency without much worry given to the people or issues— such as taking care of the environment, addressing climate change, remediating poverty, or encouraging diversity, equity, and inclusion—that could stand in the way of these things happening. Certain key areas (including the areas that I think are most important, which are education and debt management) will likely be neglected (and would have also been neglected by the Democrats). For as long as the Trump-Musk partnership lasts, they will be the main designers and implementers of this new domestic order.
美國的經濟改革極有可能會通過產業政策來實現，這些政策旨在提高生產率和效率，而不會過多顧及可能會阻礙這些事情發生的人員或問題，比如環境保護、應對氣候變化、解決貧困問題或鼓勵多樣性、公平性和包容性等。某些關鍵領域（包括我認為最為重要的教育和債務管理領域）很可能會被忽視（民主黨執政時也可能會忽視這些領域）。只要川普與馬斯克的合作關係持續下去，他們就將是這一新國內秩序的主要設計者和實施者。
These policies may well be great for Wall Street and some tech and most businesses that are plagued by regulations and worried about increased taxes. While these entities have been previously restrained in many ways from doing deals, they will be much freer from government constraints. These changes will be great for financial deal makers, banks, and asset managers because they will have more freedom and more money and credit, because capital controls will be eased and the Fed will be pressured to make money easier. These policies will be great for pro-Trump tech companies because they will be allowed to grow and operate in largely unrestrained ways. These policies will also be good for lawyers, who will be busy too. I am already seeing big changes in these people’s plans to do much more under the Trump Administration than they could have done under a Democratic government. Also, AI won’t be as regulated, and tariffs will be used to simultaneously raise tax money and protect domestic producers. If the Fed continues in its path to cut interest rates (which I don’t think it should do), that will also shift a lot of cash that is saved in money market funds and other deposits into other markets, which will be stimulative to markets and the economy.
這些政策對華爾街以及一些受監管困擾、擔心稅收增加的科技公司和大多數企業來說可能很不錯。此前這些實體在很多方面開展業務都受到限制，而今後它們將從政府的約束中獲得更大的自由。這些變化對金融交易商、銀行和資產管理者來說是好事，因為它們將擁有更多的自由、更多的資金和信貸，因為資本管制將會放鬆，聯準會也會迫於壓力讓資金更容易獲取。這些政策對支援川普的科技公司也有好處，因為它們將被允許在很大程度上不受限制地發展和營運。這些政策對律師也有好處，他們也會很忙。我已經看到這些人在川普政府治下的計畫與在民主黨政府治下相比有了很大的變化，他們打算做更多的事情。此外，人工智慧也不會受到那麼多的監管，而且關稅將被用來同時增加稅收收入和保護國內生產者。如果聯準會繼續降息（我認為它不應該這樣做），那也會將大量存於貨幣市場基金和其他存款中的現金轉移到其他市場，這將對市場和經濟起到刺激作用。
Also, the realization that the United States is in an economic war and a geopolitical war, and could find itself in a military war, with China as well as with others like Russia, Iran, and North Korea, will have big effects on domestic security and domestic policies. For example, ensuring that the U.S. will have acceptable amounts of all key technologies will lead to policies for these technologies to be made in the U.S. (e.g., 20% of the most advanced chips will have to be produced in the U.S. by 2030) or made in allied countries, which will require the central government to have strong and insist on well-implemented energy and regulatory policies that enable these changes to be made.
此外，意識到美國正處於與中國以及俄羅斯、伊朗、北北韓等其他國家的經濟競爭、地緣政治衝突，甚至可能陷入軍事衝突之中，這將對國內安全和國內政策產生重大影響。例如，為確保美國擁有足夠數量的所有關鍵技術，將會出台政策要求這些技術在美國本土（例如，到 2030 年，20% 的最先進晶片必須在美國生產）或在盟國生產，這就要求美國聯邦政府制定並堅決執行強有力的能源和監管政策以實現這些變革。
The international world order will change from a) the existing tattered remains of the post-World War II system that was created by the U.S. and its allies, in which there are/were generally agreed-upon global standards of behavior, rules, and governing organizations like the UN, WTO, International Court of Justice, IMF, World Bank, etc. to
國際世界秩序將從以下情況發生轉變： 由“a) 二戰後由美國及其盟友建立的現有千瘡百孔的體系，在該體系中，通常存在著全球公認的行為標準、規則以及諸如聯合國、世界貿易組織、國際法院、國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行等管理組織”變為
b) a more fragmented world order, in which the United States will pursue an “America First” policy with clear categorizations of allies, enemies, and nonaligned countries, as there will be greater amounts of economic and geopolitical war and a greater-than-ever chance of military war in the next 10 years. In other words, we are now coming to the end of an era led by the United States, in which countries tried to work out together how to be with each other through multinational organizations with guiding principles and rules, and into a more self-interested, law-of-the-jungle-type order with the United States being one of the two biggest players and China the other— and the fight being largely the classic one of capitalism versus communism (in their contemporary versions).
b)一個更加碎片化的世界秩序，在該秩序中，美國將奉行 “美國優先” 的政策，對盟友、敵人和不結盟國家進行明確分類，因為在接下來的 10 年裡，經濟和地緣政治戰爭的規模將會更大，發生軍事戰爭的可能性也將比以往任何時候都高。換句話說，我們如今正走向美國主導時代的尾聲，在那個時代，各國試圖通過具有指導原則和規則的跨國組織來共同解決彼此相處的問題，而現在正進入一個更加自私自利、叢林法則式的秩序，美國和中國是其中兩個最大的參與者 —— 這場爭鬥在很大程度上是當代版本的資本主義與共產主義之間的經典爭鬥。
So, concepts of morality and ethics that were shaped by American views of what is moral and ethical will be much less relevant, as the United States will no longer be the world leader in proposing and enforcing these principles. Allies and enemies will be chosen more on the basis of tactical considerations like what the deals will be. The question of which side countries are on will be most important. China will be treated as the primary enemy because it is both the most powerful and the most ideologically opposed, while Russia, North Korea, and Iran are also enemies. In fact, China is widely considered the United States’ single greatest threat, even a greater threat than the domestic threats. As for other countries, I won’t now digress into an explanation of where they stand, but I will say that they all are now categorized as allies and enemies to varying degrees, and this will be a guide for dealing with them. I will, however, say that detailed plans are now being worked out for dealing with each major country and each major subject area. All countries will be given great pressures and possibilities to change their domestic orders to be aligned with, rather than opposed to, the Trump-U.S. leadership and order, and if they don’t get on our side, they will encounter negative consequences. This conflict between the two great powers will create opportunities, most importantly business opportunities, for neutral nonaligned countries.
因此，由美國對道德和倫理的看法所塑造的道德和倫理概念將變得不那麼相關，因為美國將不再是提出和執行這些原則的世界領導者。盟友和敵人的選擇將更多地基於諸如交易條件等戰術性考慮。各國站在那一邊的問題將變得最為重要。中國將被視為首要敵人，因為它既是最強大的，在意識形態上也是最對立的，而俄羅斯、北北韓和伊朗也都是敵人。事實上，中國被廣泛認為是美國最大的威脅，甚至比國內威脅還要大。至於其他國家，我現在暫不詳細說明它們的立場，但我要說的是，它們現在都在不同程度上被歸類為盟友或敵人，這將成為與它們打交道的指南。不過，我要說明的是，目前正在制定針對每個主要國家和每個主要議題領域的詳細計畫。所有國家都將面臨巨大的壓力和可能性，要麼改變其國內秩序以與川普領導的美國及其秩序保持一致，要麼面臨負面後果。這兩個大國之間的衝突將為中立的不結盟國家創造機會，最重要的是商業機會。
This change in this world-order dynamic will also have big implications for the developing world (or the “Global South” as it’s now called), and therefore the whole world, because it contains roughly 85% of the world’s population and will likely go its own way, because the U.S. will no longer lead a common world order based on certain ideals and other countries won’t necessarily want to follow the U.S. The U.S. and China will be competing for allies, with China generally believed to be in a much better position to win over nonaligned countries because China is more important economically and does a better job exerting its soft power. Given these changes in the world order, nonaligned countries that 1) are financially strong—i.e., have good income statements and balance sheets, 2) have internal order and capital markets that facilitate people and the country to be productive, and 3) are not in an international war will benefit.
這種世界秩序動態的變化也將對開發中國家（如今也被稱為 “全球南方”）乃至整個世界產生重大影響，因為開發中國家約佔世界人口的 85%，而且很可能會自行其是，因為美國將不再基於某些理想來引領一個共同的世界秩序，其他國家也不一定願意追隨美國。美國和中國將爭奪盟友，人們普遍認為中國在爭取不結盟國家方面處於更有利的地位，因為中國在經濟上更為重要，且更善於發揮其軟實力。鑑於世界秩序的這些變化，那些 1) 財務狀況良好 —— 即擁有良好的收益表和資產負債表，2) 國內秩序和資本市場有助於人民和國家提高生產力，3) 未捲入國際戰爭的不結盟國家將從中受益。
…More government influence to achieve the government’s objectives, even if that comes at the expense of our free-market, profit-seeking system, with debates between the conservatives who favor this top-down direction and those who favor the free market more.
…… 政府為實現其目標將施加更多影響，即便這會以犧牲我們的自由市場、逐利體係為代價，保守派中支援這種自上而下方向的人和更傾向於自由市場的人之間將會展開辯論。
Along these lines, we should expect more government influence on private markets to achieve the government’s objectives. This is needed to achieve the grand plan to reshape the economy and prepare for war. So, we should keep in mindthat cost efficiency and national security achieved by the government working with national-champion companies is the primary objective, not profit-making alone, because profit making won’t achieve those goals. We should pay attention to policy shifts that will drive what areas of the economy will benefit most (e.g., the energy and minerals sectors that support the AI technology sector). While there will be free-market winners, there are obvious cases where the best companies in the United States are not good enough to give the United States what is needed (e.g., in advanced semiconductors), so key relationships with aligned foreign producers (e.g., TSMC in Taiwan) to produce in the U.S. are needed to minimize all dependencies on foreign adversaries. Besides the need to domestically produce essential technologies, there is the need to domestically produce steel, autos, and many other essential items. That will mean more onshoring and friendshoring. There is also a recognized sabotage risk of being cut off in a number of ways that will have to be dealt with.
基於此，我們應該預期到政府為實現其目標會對私人市場施加更多影響。這是實現重塑經濟並為戰爭做準備這一宏偉計畫所必需的。所以，我們應該記住，政府與國家龍頭企業合作實現的成本效益和國家安全才是首要目標，而不僅僅是盈利，因為盈利無法實現那些目標。我們應該關注政策的轉變，這些轉變將推動經濟的那些領域受益最多（例如，支援人工智慧技術領域的能源和礦物部門）。雖然會有自由市場的贏家，但很明顯，美國一些最好的公司也不足以滿足美國的需求（例如，在先進半導體領域），所以與結盟的外國生產商（例如，台灣的台積電）建立關鍵關係，以便在美國本土生產，以最大限度地減少對外國對手的依賴是必要的。除了需要在國內生產關鍵技術外，還需要在國內生產鋼鐵、汽車和許多其他關鍵物品。這意味著更多的回岸生產和友岸生產。同時，也認識到存在多種被切斷供應的破壞風險，必須加以應對。
…A massive deregulatory push in support of cost-efficient production.
…… 大力推動放鬆管制以支援成本效益型生產。
…Immigration and deportation actions, with the initial emphasis being on closing the border and deporting undocumented immigrants with criminal records.
…… 採取移民和驅逐行動，最初的重點是關閉邊境並驅逐有犯罪記錄的無證移民。
…Trade and tariff reform.
…… 進行貿易和關稅改革。
…Challenges in assembling and working with U.S. allies. Japan is our most important ally in the geopolitical conflict with China, so what is now happening there politically is important. Other allies are the U.K. and Australia, but they are not great powers. Europe is weak, has its hands full with its own problems, and doesn’t have a dog in this fight, while it has Russia on its doorstep and can’t fight it without the U.S.’s NATO support. Most other countries don’t want to get into the fight, as what is being fought for by the United States isn’t as important to them as it is to the United States, and they have more economic dependencies on China than on the U.S. The nonaligned Global South rising powers—which, along with China and Russia, are members of BRICS—are countries to pay attention to.
…… 在召集美國盟友並與其合作方面面臨挑戰。日本是我們在與中國的地緣政治衝突中的最重要盟友，所以日本國內目前的政治局勢很重要。其他盟友包括英國和澳大利亞，但它們並非大國。歐洲實力薄弱，自身問題纏身，在這場爭鬥中沒有利益牽涉，而且它家門口就有俄羅斯，沒有美國通過北約提供的支援就無法與其對抗。大多數其他國家不想捲入這場爭鬥，因為美國為之爭鬥的東西對它們來說不像對美國那麼重要，而且它們對中國的經濟依賴程度比對美國的依賴程度更高。不結盟的全球南方新興大國 —— 它們與中國和俄羅斯一道是金磚國家的成員 —— 是值得關注的國家。
…The high economic costs of being the dominant world power—i.e., of having the most important technologies, a strong military, and being able to provide soft power—will be greater than the profit-making approach can provide, so how that economic reality will be handled will need to be worked out.
…… 作為世界主導大國所面臨的高昂經濟成本 —— 即擁有最重要的技術、強大的軍事力量以及能夠提供軟實力 —— 將超過盈利所能提供的收益，所以如何應對這一經濟現實需要加以解決。
…The need to lower taxes to keep the electorate happy and to keep money in the hands of those who are most productive. Trump and his advisors believe that a lower corporate tax rate than currently exists (around 20%) will raise total taxation and raise productivity. That perspective is good for the markets.
…… 需要降低稅收以讓選民滿意並讓資金掌握在最有生產力的人手中。川普及其顧問認為，比目前更低的企業稅率（約 20%）將提高總稅收並提高生產力。這種觀點對市場有利。
…Significant reforms of the healthcare system.
…… 對醫療保健系統進行重大改革。
There is a very limited time—the first 100 days and then the first two years—to get these difficult-to-do things done, so there will have to be vicious prioritization. We don’t yet know what will be prioritized and how successful the new administration will be when the force of its aspirations meets the relatively immovable object of the entrenched system. It certainly will be an interesting and important time, so let’s stay in touch.
完成這些艱巨任務的時間非常有限 —— 先是上任後的 100 天，然後是頭兩年 —— 所以必須進行殘酷的優先排序。我們還不知道那些事情會被優先處理，以及當新政府的抱負之力遭遇根深蒂固的體制這一相對難以撼動的障礙時，新政府會有多成功。這肯定會是一個有趣且重要的時期，所以讓我們保持關注。 (黯曉)