高盛：2025年全球宏觀經濟及市場展望報告

Global Economics Analyst Macro Outlook 2025 Tailwinds (Probably) Trump Tariffs

We expect the second Trump administration to bring higher China and auto tariffs, much lower immigration, some fresh tax cuts, and regulatory easing. If so, the US economy should grow 2.5% in 2025, outperforming consensus expectations and other DM economies for the third year in a row. The biggest risk is a large across-the-board tariff, which would likely hit growth hard.

We have cut our Euro area GDP forecast to a below-consensus 0.8%, reflecting ongoing structural headwinds and a hit from trade policy uncertainty. We have also shaved our 2025 China GDP forecast to 4.5% because of higher US tariffs that are only partially offset by easier macro policies. Risks in both Europe and China are on the downside if tariffs increase beyond our baseline.

US core PCE inflation should slow to 2.4% by late 2025, higher than our prior forecast of 2.0% but still benign. Our forecast would rise to around 3% with an across-the-board tariff of 10%. In the Euro area, we expect core inflation to slow to 2% by late 2025 and are less concerned about upside risks even with a broader trade war. Lowflation risks have abated in Japan.

2025年宏觀展望：利多因素（可能）勝過關稅壓力

我們預計，第二屆川普政府可能會對中國商品和汽車徵收更高的關稅，大幅減少移民政策，推出一些新的減稅措施，並進一步放鬆監管。在這種情況下，美國經濟有望在2025年實現2.5%的增長，連續第三年超出市場共識預期，並優於其他發達經濟體（DM）。然而，全面性高額關稅構成最大的風險，可能對經濟增長造成嚴重打擊。

我們將歐元區GDP增長預測下調至0.8%（低於市場共識），這一調整反映了持續的結構性挑戰以及貿易政策不確定性的影響。同樣，我們將2025年中國GDP增長預測下調至4.5%，主要原因是更高的美國關稅。儘管中國通過寬鬆的宏觀政策部分緩解了關稅的影響，但效果有限。如果關稅規模超出我們的基線情景，歐洲和中國的經濟下行風險將更加顯著。

在通膨方面，我們預計到2025年底，美國核心個人消費支出（PCE）通膨率將放緩至2.4%，高於此前的預測值（2.0%），但仍處於溫和水平。然而，若實施全面10%的關稅，通膨率可能升至3%左右。在歐元區，我們預計核心通膨率到2025年底將下降至2%。即使更廣泛的貿易戰發生，我們對通膨上行的擔憂仍相對有限。同時，日本的低通膨風險已基本消退。

We expect significant further rate cuts over the next year. The Fed is likely to cut to 3.25-3.5%, with sequential moves through Q1 and a slowdown thereafter. We have shaved our ECB forecast to 1.75% on the back of our growth downgrade and also see significant room for policy easing in EMs. However, we expect the Bank of Japan to lift its policy rate to 0.75% by year-end.

Our baseline forecast implies a benign risk backdrop and US outperformance. We expect modest positive returns across equities, commodities, and DM bonds, alongside gradual USD appreciation. But markets have already moved a long way in a risk-positive direction, and it will be important to limit exposure to the tails around our baseline.

Moving toward a broader trade war would reinforce USD upside but put pressure on global equities. Unusually high US equity valuations not only dampen long-term expected returns but also amplify the potential reaction to any economic weakness. By contrast, positive tailwinds could emerge if policies shift to be even more corporate friendly, oil prices fall more sharply on spare capacity, or inflation and fiscal fears prove overdone.

全球貨幣政策與市場展望

我們預計未來一年將出現顯著的進一步降息。聯準會可能在第一季度連續降息，將政策利率降至3.25%-3.5%，隨後降息步伐放緩。基於我們對經濟增長的下調預測，我們已將歐洲央行（ECB）的終端利率預測下調至1.75%，同時認為新興市場（EM）仍有較大的政策寬鬆空間。然而，日本央行（BoJ）預計將在年底前將政策利率提高至0.75%。

我們的基線預測反映出風險環境總體溫和，並預示美國經濟表現持續領先。我們預計，股票、大宗商品和發達市場（DM）債券將實現溫和正回報，同時美元（USD）將逐步升值。然而，市場已經在很大程度上反映了這種風險偏好的趨勢，因此在基線預測的尾部風險上保持謹慎尤為重要。

全面貿易戰的風險可能進一步推動美元走強，但會給全球股市帶來壓力。美國股市的高估值不僅壓低了長期預期回報，還可能加劇對任何經濟疲軟的敏感反應。相比之下，如果政策轉向更有利於企業，或油價因過剩產能顯著下跌，又或者市場對通膨和財政風險的擔憂被證明過度，則可能出現積極的利多因素。

The economic data this year have reinforced our long-standing optimism about post-pandemic normalization. Global GDP growth is tracking at 2.7% in 2024, similar to the 2023 pace and slightly above our estimate of potential, with US growth again leading the way among DMs. Global labor markets have rebalanced, with both unemployment and broader measures such as our jobs-workers gap back to pre-pandemic levels. Inflation has continued to trend down and is now within striking distance of central bank targets. And most central banks are well into the process of cutting interest rates back to more normal levels.

今年的經濟資料進一步強化了我們對疫情後經濟正常化的長期樂觀預期。2024年全球GDP增長率預計為2.7%，與2023年的增速相當，略高於我們對潛在增長率的估計值，其中美國經濟增長再次在發達市場（DM）中領跑。

全球勞動力市場已實現再平衡，失業率和“職位-工人缺口”等廣義指標均恢復至疫情前的水平。通膨持續下降，目前已接近各國央行的目標範圍。同時，大多數央行已深入推進降息處理程序，努力將利率恢復至更加常規的水平。

Trumponomics 2.0…

How will US economic policy change in the second Trump administration? Exhibit 1 summarizes our expectations for four areas of focus: trade, immigration, fiscal, and regulation.

Exhibit 2 shows the effects on US GDP growth under our base case across all policies, while Exhibit 3 shows the effects for our risk case in which President-elect Trump imposes an across-the-board tariff of 10%. If this happens, the most likely timing is 2025H2. This means that there will likely be a period of uncertainty that may tighten financial conditions and weigh on growth. In our base case, the uncertainty resolves and financial conditions ease anew. In our tariff risk case, the uncertainty continues to build and financial conditions tighten further.

川普經濟學2.0：政策變化的可能路徑

第二屆川普政府將如何調整美國的經濟政策？我們在圖表1中總結了四個重點領域的預期變化：貿易、移民、財政政策和監管。

圖表2展示了基線情景下各項政策對美國GDP增長的影響，而圖表3則顯示了風險情景的影響——即川普總統實施10%的全面關稅的情況。如果這一情景發生，最可能的時間是在2025年下半年。這將導致一段充滿不確定性的時期，可能收緊金融環境並對經濟增長造成壓力。

在我們的基線情景中，這種不確定性最終將得到解決，金融環境也會重新放鬆。然而，在關稅風險情景下，不確定性可能會持續加劇，金融環境進一步收緊，對經濟的負面影響將更加顯著。

The effects from the new policies on US GDP are small and largely offsetting under our baseline outlook. The new administration is likely to announce the China and auto tariffs relatively soon after the January 20 inauguration, which could also fuel uncertainty about broader tariff measures among businesses and market participants. These tariffs would result in a modest hit to real disposable personal income via higher consumer prices, and the broader uncertainty of how much further the trade war might escalate is likely to weigh on business investment. The result is a net drag averaging 0.2pp in 2025. Assuming that the trade war does not escalate further, we expect the positive impulses from tax cuts, a friendlier regulatory environment, and improved “animal spirits” among businesses to dominate in 2026, with a net boost to growth averaging 0.3pp.

在我們的基線預測中，新政策對美國GDP的影響較小，且大體上相互抵消。新一屆政府可能會在1月20日就職後不久宣佈針對中國商品和汽車的關稅，這可能加劇企業和市場參與者對更廣泛關稅措施的不確定性。這些關稅將通過更高的消費價格對實際可支配個人收入造成一定衝擊，同時，貿易戰可能進一步升級的不確定性可能抑制企業投資。

綜合來看，這些因素預計將在2025年對經濟增長造成平均0.2個百分點的拖累。假設貿易戰沒有進一步升級，我們預計減稅、更友好的監管環境，以及企業更加積極的“動物精神”（市場信心）的正面推動力將在2026年佔據主導地位，為經濟增長平均帶來0.3個百分點的提振。

In our tariff risk case, by contrast, the modest negative impulse from the China and auto tariffs gives way to a bigger negative impulse from the across-the-board tariff, both because the hit to real income increases and because trade policy uncertainty builds further. In 2026, this results in a net drag on growth averaging 1.0pp and peaking at 1.2pp, although the peak drag declines to 0.8pp if we assume that the increased tariff revenue is fully recycled into tax cuts.

與基線情景相比，在關稅風險情景下，來自中國商品和汽車關稅的溫和負面衝擊將被全面關稅帶來的更大負面影響取代。這種影響不僅體現在對實際收入的更大壓縮，還表現在貿易政策不確定性的進一步加劇。

到2026年，這一情景預計對經濟增長的平均拖累達1.0個百分點，並在峰值時達到1.2個百分點。然而，如果假設新增的關稅收入全部用於減稅，峰值拖累可減輕至0.8個百分點。

…And Its Effects on Europe and China

The growth hit from US trade policy is greater elsewhere. One key finding in our research on tariffs is the important impact of trade policy uncertainty (TPU) on growth in the Euro area. The left chart in Exhibit 4 summarizes research suggesting that a rise in TPU to the peak levels of the 2018-19 trade war would subtract 0.3% from GDP in the US but as much as 0.9% in the Euro area. Moreover, the right chart shows that trade policy uncertainty (measured via mentions in corporate earnings reports) has already risen much more in the Euro area than in the US. We therefore cut our 2025 Euro area growth forecast on the back of the US election results by 0.5pp on a Q4/Q4 basis and would likely cut it further if the US imposes an across-the-board tariff.

對歐洲和中國的影響

美國貿易政策對其他地區的經濟增長打擊更為顯著。我們的關稅研究揭示了貿易政策不確定性（TPU）對歐元區增長的重要影響。在圖表4的左圖中，研究結果表明，TPU上升至2018-19年貿易戰的峰值水平時，美國GDP將減少0.3%，而歐元區GDP的降幅可能高達0.9%。此外，右圖顯示，貿易政策不確定性（通過企業財報中相關提及次數衡量）在歐元區的上升幅度已顯著高於美國。

基於美國大選結果帶來的影響，我們將2025年歐元區增長預測的Q4/Q4增速下調了0.5個百分點。如果美國實施全面關稅，我們可能還會進一步下調歐元區的增長預測。

The impact is more direct in China, which will almost certainly face tariff increases that we expect will reach up to 60pp and average 20pp across all exports to the US. As shown in Exhibit 5, we estimate that the US tariff increase in our baseline scenario will subtract almost 0.7pp from China growth in 2025. Assuming that Chinese policymakers provide macro stimulus and some of the growth hit is offset by RMB depreciation, we have cut our 2025 growth forecast more modestly, by 0.2pp on net to 4.5%. However, we would likely make larger downgrades if the trade war were to escalate further, either with an across-the-board tariff or more aggressive China-specific measures such as an end to permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) between the US and China.

對中國的直接影響

相比其他地區，中國受到的影響更加直接。中國幾乎可以肯定將面臨關稅上調，我們預計關稅增幅可能高達60個百分點，平均對所有出口至美國的商品徵收約20個百分點的關稅。如圖表5所示，在我們的基線情景中，美國關稅的上調預計將在2025年削減中國經濟增長近0.7個百分點。

考慮到中國政府可能通過宏觀刺激政策應對，以及人民幣貶值在一定程度上抵消了部分衝擊，我們對2025年中國經濟增長的預測進行了相對溫和的下調，僅削減0.2個百分點，至4.5%。然而，如果貿易戰進一步升級，例如實施全面關稅或採取更具針對性的措施（如終止中美之間的永久正常貿易關係 PNTR），我們可能會進行更大幅度的預測下調。

We also expect a drag from US trade policy in other economies, with larger drags in more trade-exposed economies and potential boosts in certain EMs that are well positioned to gain export share if trade shifts away from China (e.g., Mexico and Vietnam). Overall, we estimate changes to US trade policy will subtract 0.4% from global GDP, although increased policy support should dampen this hit. The impact could be 2-3 times larger if the US imposes a 10% across-the-board tariff.

美國貿易政策對其他經濟體的影響

我們預計，美國貿易政策還會對其他經濟體造成拖累，對貿易依賴程度更高的經濟體的影響更大。與此同時，一些新興市場（EM）國家可能因貿易從中國轉移而獲得出口份額的提升，例如墨西哥和越南。

整體來看，估計美國貿易政策的變化將導致全球GDP下降0.4%，儘管政策支援的增加可能在一定程度上緩解這一影響。如果美國實施10%的全面關稅，其影響可能擴大至2-3倍。

Modest Price Boosts from Tariffs

Higher tariffs will also raise US inflation, at least in the short term. The experience of the first Trump administration shows that tariffs are largely passed on to consumer prices. This is visible in the fact that prices in tariffed PCE categories rose by almost exactly the tariff amount, while prices in non-tariffed categories remained on their prior trend (Exhibit 6).

If tariffs are confined to China and autos from Europe and Mexico, this analysis implies that the US inflation impact will be a relatively modest 0.3-0.4pp, as shown in Exhibit 7. If we add a broader 10% across-the-board tariff, the impact rises to almost 1.2pp. Barring significant second-round effects via expectations or wages, however, tariff effects are price level effects, so the inflation impact subsides in 2026-2027. Outside the US, inflation effects should be minor even under our assumption of full retaliation.

關稅引發的溫和價格上漲

更高的關稅將在短期內推動美國通膨上升。第一屆川普政府的經驗表明，關稅的成本大部分轉嫁到了消費者價格上。這一點可以從資料中看出：徵收關稅的個人消費支出（PCE）類別價格幾乎完全按關稅幅度上升，而未徵收關稅的類別價格則保持原有趨勢（見圖表6）。

如果關稅僅限於中國商品以及來自歐洲和墨西哥的汽車，本分析表明其對美國通膨的影響相對溫和，約為0.3-0.4個百分點（見圖表7）。但如果加征全面10%的關稅，通膨的影響可能升至近1.2個百分點。然而，若無通過預期或工資產生的顯著次輪效應，關稅的影響主要是價格水平效應，因此預計通膨影響將在2026-2027年逐漸消退。

在美國以外的地區，即使假設全面報復性措施，通膨影響預計仍較小。

Another Solid Year for Global Growth

The upshot is that, barring a broader trade war, policy changes in the second Trump administration are unlikely to change the broad contours of our global economic views.

As shown in Exhibit 8, we expect global growth to average 2.7% in 2025, nearly the same pace as in 2024 and slightly above consensus. Relative to consensus, we are optimistic in the US and pessimistic in the Euro area, with other major economies in between.

A key reason for optimism on global growth is the dramatic inflation decline over the past two years. This directly supports real income because price inflation has fallen far more quickly than wage inflation, which is still elevated as workers make up for the real wage losses they suffered in the early post-pandemic years. The resulting strength in real hourly wages has helped real disposable household income grow 3-4% over the past year across the major advanced economies, a pace that is likely to moderate in Europe but should remain strong in the US and Canada in 2025 (Exhibit 9).

全球增長再迎穩健一年

總體而言，只要不發生更大範圍的貿易戰，第二屆川普政府的政策變化預計不會顯著改變我們對全球經濟的整體看法。

正如圖表8所示，我們預計2025年全球經濟增長率將平均達到2.7%，與2024年的增速幾乎持平，且略高於市場共識。相較於市場預期，我們對美國經濟持樂觀態度，對歐元區則偏悲觀，其他主要經濟體的預期介於兩者之間。

支撐全球經濟增長的一個關鍵因素是過去兩年通膨水平的大幅下降。這一趨勢直接提升了實際收入，因為價格通膨的下降速度顯著快於工資通膨，而工資通膨仍處於較高水平，反映了勞動力為彌補疫情後實際工資損失所進行的調整。這種趨勢帶來了實際小時工資的增長，從而推動了主要發達經濟體過去一年實際可支配家庭收入增長了3-4%。儘管這種增速在歐洲可能會有所放緩，但在美國和加拿大預計將在2025年保持強勁（見圖表9）。

Just as importantly, the inflation decline also indirectly supports demand by allowing central banks to normalize monetary policy and thereby ease financial conditions. Under the simplifying assumption that our financial conditions indices remain at their latest spot level, we estimate a positive impulse to growth of about 0.2pp across the G10 economies over the next four quarters (Exhibit 10). If financial conditions ease further on the back of solid global growth and central bank policy rate cuts, the positive impulse would be greater.

同樣重要的是，通膨的下降還通過允許央行正常化貨幣政策並從而緩解金融環境，間接支援了需求。在假設我們的金融條件指數保持在當前水平不變的情況下，我們估算未來四個季度，G10經濟體將因此獲得約0.2個百分點的增長正向推動力（見圖表10）。如果全球增長強勁且央行進一步下調政策利率從而進一步緩解金融條件，那麼這一正向推動力將更為顯著。

None of this explains why real GDP is growing so much faster in the US than in other advanced economies. The answer, instead, is found on the supply side. Following the recent revisions to the US national accounts, labor productivity in the US has grown at a 1.7% annualized rate since late 2019, a clear acceleration from the pre-pandemic trend of 1.3%. By contrast, labor productivity in the Euro area has grown at a 0.2% annualized rate over the same period, a clear deceleration from an already-mediocre 0.7% before the pandemic. Other advanced economies have shown similarly lackluster trends (Exhibit 11). We expect US productivity growth to remain significantly stronger than elsewhere, and this is a key reason why we expect US GDP growth to continue to outperform.

為何美國實際GDP增速遠超其他發達經濟體？

這一現象並非由需求側因素解釋，而是可以從供給側找到答案。根據最近對美國國家帳戶資料的修訂，自2019年底以來，美國的勞動生產率年化增速達到了1.7%，明顯快於疫情前1.3%的增長趨勢。相比之下，歐元區勞動生產率同期僅實現了0.2%的年化增速，遠低於疫情前已顯平庸的0.7%水平。其他發達經濟體的表現也同樣乏力（見圖表11）。

我們預計，美國的生產率增長將持續顯著高於其他經濟體，這是我們預期美國GDP增長繼續領先的一個關鍵原因。

Remember Bumpy Disinflation?

We have revised up our core PCE inflation forecast for late 2025 to 2.4%, from 2.0% before the election. Moreover, the risks are tilted to the high side because of the risk of a broader trade war. An across-the-board tariff of 10% on top of the China and auto tariffs would likely raise core inflation to 3.1% in early 2026 (Exhibit 12).

Even our revised US inflation forecast is quite benign, at least in the baseline. This is partly just an extrapolation of recent trends. Although core inflation is still modestly above target, at least on a year-on-year basis, both headline inflation and 3-month annualized core inflation are close to (and in several cases below) target across most major DM economies. Australia is a high-side outlier, but it’s worth remembering that the RBA pursues a higher 2-3% inflation target vs. 2% for most other central banks (Exhibit 13).

回顧通膨下降的波動路徑

我們將2025年底美國核心個人消費支出（PCE）通膨率的預測從2.0%上調至2.4%。此外，由於更廣泛貿易戰的可能性，通膨風險偏向上行。如果在中國商品和汽車關稅基礎上加征10%的全面關稅，核心通膨可能在2026年初升至3.1%（見圖表12）。

即使經過修訂，我們的美國通膨預測在基線情景下依然相對溫和。這在一定程度上是對近期趨勢的延續。儘管核心通膨仍略高於目標（按同比計算），但在多數主要發達經濟體中，整體通膨和3個月年化核心通膨已接近甚至低於目標。在這一背景下，澳大利亞是一個高位例外，但需要注意的是，澳大利亞央行（RBA）追求的是2-3%的通膨目標，高於其他央行通常設定的2%目標（見圖表13）。

There are also strong fundamental reasons to expect core inflation progress to continue. Aside from a direct tariff boost in the US, core goods inflation should remain low due to continued growth in Chinese exports and inventory normalization in Europe. Meanwhile, shelter inflation should continue to cool, particularly in the US where market rent indicators have looked benign for nearly two years but the official measures are only gradually catching up with reality (Exhibit 14).

核心通膨有望持續改善，這背後有多方面的基本面支撐。儘管美國可能因直接關稅上調面臨一定壓力，但核心商品通膨預計將保持低位，這得益於中國出口的持續增長以及歐洲庫存的逐步正常化。

同時，住房通膨預計將繼續放緩，尤其是在美國。過去近兩年中，美國的市場租金指標已經呈現溫和趨勢，但官方統計資料的調整仍在逐步追趕實際情況（見圖表14）。

Most importantly, services ex energy and housing—which make up well over half of the core indices—are particularly sensitive to labor costs. It is therefore reassuring that a broad set of labor market tightness measures across advanced economies have returned to pre-pandemic levels. For now, wage growth remains somewhat above the pace compatible with target-consistent inflation assuming productivity grows in line with the long-term trend. However, much of the remaining gap reflects lags in the catch-up of negotiated wages to the earlier price surge, and we expect steady further wage disinflation in 2025 (Exhibit 15).

最重要的是，剔除能源和住房的服務類項目——它們佔核心通膨指數的一半以上——對勞動力成本尤為敏感。因此，令人欣慰的是，發達經濟體的多項勞動力市場緊張程度指標已恢復至疫情前水平。

目前，工資增速仍略高於與目標一致的通膨水平所需的增速（假設生產率與長期趨勢一致增長）。然而，這一差距的大部分反映了談判工資對早期價格上漲的滯後反應。我們預計，在2025年，工資增速將繼續穩步下降，從而帶來工資通膨的進一步緩解（見圖表15）。

Thus, both the recent numbers and the fundamentals point to further across-the-boarddisinflation, as shown in Exhibit 16. While we expect the Euro area and Canada toreturn fully to 2% by late 2025, the US, the UK, and Australia are likely to cluster around2½%, with additional declines in 2026 likely. The inflation surge of 2021-2022 is nowfirmly in the rearview mirror.

無論是近期資料還是基本面，都表明通膨將在各領域持續回落（見圖表16）。我們預計，歐元區和加拿大的通膨將在2025年底全面回歸2%的目標水平，而美國、英國和澳大利亞的通膨可能保持在2.5%左右，並有望在2026年進一步下降。

2021-2022年的通膨高峰如今已成為歷史，全球通膨回歸正常水平的趨勢愈加清晰。

Further Gradual Rate Cuts Ahead

Against this backdrop, we do not expect the US election outcome to derail the policy normalization process that is currently underway, and see most major central banks easing significantly further through 2025.

We forecast that the Fed will cut to 3.25-3.5% with sequential moves through Q1 and a slowdown thereafter. If anything, the threat of a near-term growth drag from tariffs and the Fed leadership’s continued preference for frontloaded policy normalization have strengthened our confidence in sequential cuts through early next year. While the pace after Q1 and ultimate stopping point—which may depend on the Fed’s willingness to respond preemptively to future inflation boosts from President-elect Trump’s policies—admittedly remain uncertain, our baseline and probability-weighted Fed forecasts are meaningfully more dovish than current market pricing (Exhibit 17).

未來將迎來進一步的漸進降息

在當前經濟背景下，我們認為美國大選結果不會中斷正在進行的政策正常化處理程序，預計大多數主要央行將在2025年大幅放鬆貨幣政策。

我們預測，聯準會將在2025年第一季度之前採取連續降息行動，將利率降至3.25%-3.5%。此後，降息步伐將有所放緩。事實上，關稅可能對短期增長造成拖累的風險，加上聯準會領導層對前置式政策正常化的偏好，增強了我們對明年初持續降息的信心。

儘管第一季度以後的降息節奏及最終利率水平仍存在不確定性，可能取決於聯準會是否願意針對當選總統川普的政策可能引發的未來通膨上升提前應對，但我們的基線預測和加權機率預測顯著比當前市場定價更偏鴿派（見圖表17）。

Exhibit 18 shows our policy forecasts for other DMs. In the Euro area, we continue to expect sequential ECB cuts and have lowered our terminal forecast to 1.75% on the back of our growth downgrade. In the UK, we are raising our BoE forecast to reflect a better growth outlook following a more expansionary Autumn Budget, and now expect quarterly cuts back to 3.75% by end-2025 and a terminal rate of 3.25% in 2026Q2. We continue to see risks of faster UK cuts if near-term growth disappoints, however, and our terminal rate forecast remains well below market pricing.

We generally expect more aggressive cuts in smaller DM central banks where inflation progress is even more convincing and unemployment rates have risen more meaningfully. The BoC, RBNZ, and Riksbank have already delivered 50bp cuts, and we anticipate the BoC, RBNZ, and SNB will each cut by 50bp at their next meetings. The exception among smaller DMs is Australia, where we continue to expect quarterly rate cuts starting in February. But even here we see risks as skewed dovish given that growth remains weak and inflation indicators aren’t that different from other DMs where cutting cycles are well underway

其他發達市場央行的政策展望

如圖表18所示，我們對其他發達市場（DM）的貨幣政策預測如下：

在歐元區，我們預計歐洲央行（ECB）將繼續採取連續降息措施，並基於經濟增長預期下調，將終端利率預測下調至1.75%。在英國，由於更具擴張性的秋季預算改善了增長前景，我們上調了對英國央行（BoE）的預測，預計到2025年底每季度降息至3.75%，並在2026年第二季度達到3.25%的終端利率。然而，如果短期增長表現不及預期，英國降息的步伐可能會更快，我們的終端利率預測仍顯著低於市場定價。

我們預計在通膨下降更明顯、失業率顯著上升的小型發達市場央行中，降息步伐將更加激進。例如，加拿大央行（BoC）、**紐西蘭央行（RBNZ）和瑞典央行（Riksbank）已實施了50個基點的降息，我們預計這些央行將在下次會議上再次降息50個基點。此外，我們預計瑞士央行（SNB）**也將採取類似措施。

澳大利亞是一個例外。儘管我們預計澳洲聯儲（RBA）將在明年2月開始每季度降息，但由於增長疲軟且通膨指標與其他已經啟動降息周期的發達經濟體相差無幾，澳大利亞的政策風險仍偏向鴿派。

We see significant room for monetary easing in EMs as well given that policy rates remain far above neutral (Exhibit 19). This is especially true in Latin America and CEEMEA, but we also expect rate cuts to broaden in Asia over the next few quarters. The main exception to our forecast for EM rate cuts is Brazil, where we anticipate an overheated economy will prompt another 150bp in rate hikes through 2025Q1 (to 12.75%) followed by 125bp in rate cuts (to 11.50%) by end-2025. Our EM policy rate forecasts are quite dovish relative to market pricing.

我們認為，新興市場（EM）也有顯著的貨幣寬鬆空間，因為當前政策利率仍遠高於中性水平（見圖表19）。這一趨勢在拉丁美洲和中東、東歐和非洲地區（CEEMEA）尤為顯著，同時我們預計未來幾個季度亞洲的降息範圍也將進一步擴大。

然而，巴西是一個例外。我們預計由於經濟過熱，巴西央行將在2025年第一季度前再加息150個基點（將利率提高至12.75%），隨後在2025年底前降息125個基點（將利率下調至11.50%）。我們的新興市場政策利率預測相比市場定價明顯更偏鴿派。

The main outlier to our forecast for steady rate cuts is Japan. A pickup in inflation and wage growth after three decades of anemic price pressures allowed the BoJ to exit negative interest rate policy in March and hike again in July. We are increasingly confident lowflation risks are behind us and rate hikes will continue. Wage growth  should remain firm (we forecast a 3-3.5% base pay increase in spring 2025’s shunto wage negotiations) and is increasingly correlated with price increases, suggesting that a  virtuous wage-price spiral that will help anchor inflation expectations has emerged. In addition, demand looks more robust and policy space has increased relative to the recent past, suggesting less downside inflation risk in the event that activity weakens. We expect that new core CPI (ex fresh food and energy) will increase by 2.1%  year-over-year in 2025 and 2.0% in 2026 on an annual average basis, a target-consistent pace that supports our forecast for 25bp semi-annual hikes to 0.75% by end-2025 and a terminal rate of 1.5% in 2027 (Exhibit 20).

日本貨幣政策的特例

與我們對其他經濟體普遍降息的預測不同，日本是一個顯著的特例。由於經歷了三十年低迷價格壓力後的通膨和工資增長回升，日本央行（BoJ）在3月結束負利率政策，並在7月再次加息。我們對低通膨風險已成為歷史的信心不斷增強，預計日本將繼續加息。

工資增長預計將保持強勁，我們預測2025年春季“春斗”工資談判中的基本工資漲幅為3%-3.5%。與此同時，工資增長與價格上漲的關聯性正在增強，這表明一個良性的工資-價格螺旋正在形成，有助於穩定通膨預期。此外，需求表現更為穩健，政策空間也較近期顯著擴大，這表明即便經濟活動減弱，通膨下行風險也較小。

我們預計，日本的新核心CPI（剔除生鮮食品和能源）將在2025年實現同比增長2.1%，在2026年實現年均增長2.0%，這一符合目標的通膨水平支援我們的預測，即日本央行將在2025年底通過每半年加息25個基點將利率提升至0.75%，並在2027年達到1.5%的終端利率（見圖表20）。

Better US Growth but Better Market Pricing

Our baseline economic forecast for steady growth, cooling inflation, and further non-recessionary rate cuts, as well as policies that could be helpful to corporate earnings, represents a friendly risk asset backdrop for 2025. This view, alongside our economic forecast for continued US outperformance is reflected by our baseline 2025 market forecasts.

A key challenge, however, is that markets have already moved a long way to price this kind of outlook. Our US growth view is once again well above the consensus forecast. But both ahead of and since the election, investors have sharply upgraded the US growth views embedded in assets, pushing US equities and the USD to fresh highs and widening the gap between US and European bond yields (Exhibit 21). We think our baseline forecasts still justify higher equity prices and further USD outperformance, but that judgment is more finely balanced than it was. As US markets take more credit for favorable policies up front, the risk of ultimate disappointment will rise.

美國經濟增長更強勁，但市場定價更充分

我們的基線經濟預測表明，穩定的經濟增長、通膨回落和非衰退性的進一步降息，以及有利於企業盈利的政策，將為2025年的風險資產提供友好的環境。這一觀點與我們對美國經濟持續領先的預測一致，並體現在我們2025年的基線市場預測中。

然而，市場定價已在很大程度上反映了這一前景。這是一個關鍵挑戰。儘管我們的美國經濟增長預測仍顯著高於市場共識，但在大選前後，投資者對資產價格中反映的美國增長預期進行了大幅上調，推動美國股市和美元創下新高，並進一步擴大了美歐債券收益率之間的差距（見圖表21）。

我們認為，基線預測仍支援更高的股價和美元的進一步走強，但與之前相比，這一判斷已更為謹慎。隨著美國市場在早期充分消化了政策利多，最終令人失望的風險也將隨之上升。

Because the market has moved much closer to our central case, our forecasts for many key assets are not far from current levels. The modest positive returns that we expect for many assets come more from the yield or carry than a big shift in spot prices. This means that the investing backdrop is likely to depend on the distribution around that base case even more than usual. The US election outcome widens the distribution of policy shifts. The core challenge continues to involve maintaining some exposure to a robust US economic outlook, while protecting against the key tail risks.

由於市場定價已經非常接近我們的基線預測，我們對許多關鍵資產的預測值與當前水平相差不大。我們預計，許多資產的溫和正回報更多來自於收益率或持有收益，而非現貨價格的大幅變動。這意味著，投資背景可能會比以往更依賴基線預測周圍的分佈情況。

美國大選結果擴大了政策變化的分佈範圍，進一步增加了不確定性。核心挑戰在於如何保持對美國經濟強勁前景的適度敞口，同時規避關鍵尾部風險。

Tail Risks Now a Critical Focus

The potential for a broader trade war looms large among those tails. The narrowly focused tariffs that feature in our baseline scenario are likely to be less disruptive both to the US economic picture and to China’s trade and markets, given the experience since the first round of tariffs in 2018-2019 and China’s reduced trade exposure to the US. As in 2019, the actual announcement of tariffs could still move markets, including China’s currency. But expectations of action on this front are high and markets are relatively well-prepared for these outcomes.

We think the impact of a broader across-the-board tariff is underpriced, particularly for its potential impact on Europe and some non-China EM economies (the incremental pressure on China should be relatively smaller given that tariffs are already expected). We think a firmer shift in this direction could lead to meaningful further USD upside (Exhibit 22) and add to downward pressure on non-US equities and bond yields. Our baseline forecast is already one in which European GDP growth is below consensus and European yields and EUR/USD decline further. A broader trade war would add to those pressures. The impact on US markets is less certain, but we think across-the-board tariffs and the threat of retaliatory action could weigh on US equities too and might ultimately push US yields lower, as it did in 2019.

尾部風險成為關鍵關注點

全面貿易戰的可能性在當前尾部風險中尤為突出。在我們的基線預測中，影響範圍較小的針對性關稅對美國經濟、中國的貿易與市場的干擾相對有限。這一點已在2018-2019年首輪關稅中得到驗證，且中國對美貿易依賴已顯著下降。與2019年類似，關稅的實際宣佈仍可能對市場產生影響，包括對人民幣匯率的衝擊，但由於市場對這一前景已有較高預期，相關應對措施已較為充分。

相比之下，市場對全面性關稅的潛在影響存在低估。特別是這一政策可能對歐洲及部分非中國的新興市場經濟體造成更大壓力（相較之下，中國所受的增量壓力會較小，因為市場已預期部分關稅政策）。如果政策更明確地向這一方向轉變，我們預計將進一步推動美元顯著走強（見圖表22），並對非美股市和債券收益率施加更多下行壓力。

在我們的基線預測中，歐洲GDP增長已低於市場共識，歐洲債券收益率和歐元兌美元匯率（EUR/USD）也呈進一步下降趨勢。全面貿易戰將加劇這些壓力。對美國市場的影響則不確定性較大，但我們認為，全面性關稅及其可能引發的報復行動，將對美股構成壓力，並可能最終使美國債券收益率進一步下降，類似於2019年的情況。

In other areas, we think the risks are more balanced. The US election has clearly  increased the possibility of additional fiscal expansion and fresh focus on the sustainability of the US public debt profile. But our central scenario of only modest fiscal stimulus makes us more skeptical that we will see a sharp increase in fiscal risk premium in US Treasury markets. Even in the UK, where the market has worried more in the light of the recent budget, we would look to fade those risks in both rates and currency markets. Given our robust US growth views, the bigger upside risk may simply be an earlier stopping point to the Fed easing cycle, which could prompt markets to judge that the neutral rate is higher than we are assuming. It is only in Japan where our baseline policy path lies well above the market and where we expect bonds to underperform. Near-term inflation risks are also two-sided, after a sharp move higher in market pricing of US inflation over the next couple of years. Short-dated US inflation swaps are priced well above our US inflation forecast, so we think this is one area of the market that already reflects a meaningful chance of broader trade risks.

Oil market tails lie in both directions too. In our baseline forecast, we expect Brent prices to stay in a $70-$85/bbl range. But the risks of breaking that range are growing. In the short term, the new administration raises the risks to Iranian supply, which have already been elevated due to Israel-Iran conflict. That upside tail risk adds to the value of commodity longs in a portfolio context. We think the medium-term risks, however,skew to the downside of our forecast range. That is both because ample supply is still being kept off the market which could begin to find its way back into the system in 2025, but also because broader-based tariff action could hurt global demand. In those scenarios, oil prices might again become a tailwind for disinflation trends.

High Valuations Fatten the Downside

High valuations reinforce the importance of focusing on these tail risks. US equity valuations are now at levels that have not been exceeded in the post-war era except in the late 1990s. Some of the recent uplift comes on expectations that upcoming policies will boost after-tax earnings. But even adjusting for this, US equity valuations look historically high (Exhibit 23). Credit spreads too are near their historical lows, and even those segments of the market that were pricing more elevated risk premium have now compressed. As our Portfolio Strategy team recently showed, the long-term expected returns from equities now look low as a result (they estimate 3% nominal returns over the next decade when accounting for the risks from unusually high market concentration). As a result, prospective returns on government bonds and credit on that longer horizon look relatively better, reflecting historically low levels of the Equity Risk Premium and Equity-Credit Premium.

風險均衡與高估值下的市場動態

在其他領域，我們認為風險更加均衡。美國大選顯然增加了進一步財政擴張的可能性，同時也引發了對美國公共債務可持續性的關注。然而，我們的基線預測是僅有溫和的財政刺激，因此我們對美國國債市場的財政風險溢價大幅上升持更懷疑的態度。即使是在市場對英國預算更為擔憂的情況下，我們仍然傾向於淡化利率和匯率市場中的相關風險。

考慮到我們對美國經濟增長的強勁預期，更大的上行風險可能在於聯準會降息周期的提前結束，這可能促使市場判斷中性利率高於預期。而在日本，我們的基線政策路徑明顯高於市場預期，因此我們預計日本債券表現將相對較差。

短期通膨風險也存在兩面性。儘管未來幾年市場對美國通膨的定價大幅上升，但短期通膨互換的價格已遠高於我們的通膨預測，這一市場類股可能已反映了更大範圍的貿易風險可能性。

原油市場的尾部風險同樣存在雙向性。我們基線預測中的布倫特油價將維持在70-85美元/桶的區間，但突破這一區間的風險正在上升。短期內，新政府可能加劇伊朗供應風險，尤其是在當前以色列-伊朗衝突的背景下。這種上行尾部風險提升了大宗商品多頭在投資組合中的價值。然而，從中期看，風險更偏向下行，這不僅是因為充足的供應可能在2025年重新進入市場，還因為更廣泛的關稅行動可能打壓全球需求。在這種情景下，油價可能再次成為通縮趨勢的推動因素。

高估值放大下行風險

高估值使得關注尾部風險更加重要。目前，美國股市估值已達到二戰後僅在1990年代末被超過的水平。儘管近期的上漲部分源於對政策將推動稅後收益的預期，但即使在調整這一因素後，美國股市的估值仍處於歷史高位（見圖表23）。

同時，信用利差接近歷史低點，即使是此前定價較高風險溢價的市場類股也出現了明顯壓縮。正如我們投資組合策略團隊近期所示，長期來看，這使得股票的預期回報較低（預計名義回報率在未來十年僅為3%，考慮到市場異常高的集中度帶來的風險）。因此，在更長的時間跨度上，政府債券和信用資產的預期回報相對更具吸引力，反映了股票風險溢價和股票-信用溢價的歷史低水平。

Rich valuations are not an obstacle to further equity gains if the cyclical tailwinds are powerful, as we have seen already in 2024. For US equities, we find that the price for higher valuations is often paid disproportionately when the cycle deteriorates (Exhibit24). Our baseline forecast means that challenge will most likely be avoided in 2025. But if growth risks do rise more sharply than we anticipate, equity downside could be faster and deeper than normal. The sharp drops in risk assets, and spikes in volatility, in early August may be a harbinger of that kind of sensitivity. That fatter downside tail also highlights the importance of keeping an eye on another kind of “valuation challenge”—the point at which our more optimistic macro forecasts seem fully reflected in assets. As in 2024, we are likely to push harder on our asset views when the market is clearly in doubt about elements of our macro picture.

高估值與周期性尾部風險的權衡

高估值並不一定阻礙股市進一步上漲，前提是周期性利多因素足夠強勁，正如我們在2024年所見。然而，對於美國股市而言，高估值帶來的代價往往在經濟周期惡化時表現得尤為顯著（見圖表24）。根據我們的基線預測，這一風險在2025年很可能得以避免。但如果增長風險超出預期顯著上升，股市下行可能比正常情況更快且幅度更大。

2024年8月初風險資產的劇烈下跌和波動率飆升可能預示了市場對這種敏感性的反應。這種更大的下行尾部風險也突顯了關注另一種“估值挑戰”的重要性——即我們更樂觀的宏觀預測是否已經被資產價格充分反映。當市場對我們的宏觀圖景中的某些要素存在明顯疑慮時，正如2024年的情況，我們可能會更積極地調整我們的資產觀點。

Maintain Exposure, Limit Tails

Although markets have already moved to reflect key elements of our macro view, we still forecast modest positive returns across the key asset classes (Exhibit 25). US growth resilience should still support outperformance of US equities and

underperformance of US bonds, alongside some further expected upside to the US dollar. Given subdued valuations, EM equities are likely to outperform fixed income.And while EM hard currency fixed income should prove more defensive than local currency in a strong USD environment, local currency assets have more scope to perform if the tails are avoided. Commodity markets should continue to benefit from a positive roll return, with lower contribution from price shifts.

保持敞口，控制尾部風險

儘管市場已經反映了我們宏觀觀點中的關鍵要素，但我們仍然預測主要資產類別將實現溫和的正回報（見圖表25）。美國經濟的韌性預計將繼續推動美國股市表現優於其他市場，而美國債券表現遜色，同時美元可能進一步走強。

在估值較低的背景下，新興市場（EM）股票可能表現優於固定收益資產。儘管在美元走強的環境下，新興市場的硬通貨債券預計比本地貨幣資產更具防禦性，但如果尾部風險得以規避，本地貨幣資產有更多的表現空間。

此外，大宗商品市場預計將繼續從正的展期收益中受益，但價格變動的貢獻將較低。

The key challenge is to maintain exposure to these themes, while limiting the major tail risks. Diversification can help address some of these challenges. The ongoing decline in inflation across a range of economies in 2024 has allowed central banks, including the Fed, to focus more on the risks to growth. We see risks from both growth and inflation/policy shocks, particularly in the next few months as the Trump policy agenda takes shape. But although the market may still oscillate between these different risks,we think the correlation of bonds and equities is more likely to drift lower than higher over the medium term. This means that US Treasuries, and even more so Bunds and Gilts, can still play an important diversifying role in portfolios. TIPS too look appealing since real yields have room to fall if growth disappoints, but inflation protection remains valuable. Broadening US equity exposure towards mid-cap equities or a more equal-weighted allocation may mitigate concentration and valuation risks. Long USD positions should also provide protection against both US rate upside and broadening tariff risks, reinforcing the case for US investors to keep hedging their overseas bonds (and equity) exposures.

As in 2024, we think there are strong arguments for using options to provide protection against macro tails. Equity volatility has fallen post-election and this makes it easier to gain upside exposure to US assets through call options again. Deeper downside exposure (including in European equities which are vulnerable to some key risks) also looks more attractively priced. Long USD optionality remains appealing (especially against EUR, CAD, SGD and KRW), while upside in gold and oil can still protect against some key tails. Some assets could also benefit if US policy risks fail to materialize. In 2017, the first year of the first Trump administration, EM stocks and currencies ultimately outperformed. A more restrained US fiscal impulse, or a more narrowly focused trade agenda, could again provide relief to parts of the EM universe where those risks have been most clearly reflected. Some exposure to that kind of upside may be useful too.The wider range of potential market outcomes means that any declines in volatility across assets in 2025 are likely to be opportunities to add hedges.

關鍵在於保持敞口並限制尾部風險

維持對核心投資主題的敞口，同時有效控制尾部風險，是當前投資策略的主要挑戰。多元化是應對這些挑戰的一個重要工具。2024年通膨在多國持續回落，使包括聯準會在內的央行得以更加關注增長風險。我們認為，未來幾個月中，隨著川普政策議程的逐步成型，市場將面臨來自增長和通膨/政策衝擊的雙重風險。儘管市場可能在不同風險之間反覆震盪，但我們預計債券與股票的相關性在中期內更可能降低而非提高。因此，美國國債（尤其是德國國債和英國金邊債券）仍是投資組合中重要的多元化工具。

同時，TIPS（通膨保值債券）也具備吸引力，因為在增長令人失望的情況下，實際收益率可能下降，而通膨保護仍然具有價值。為了減少集中化和估值風險，將美國股票敞口拓展至中型股或採用更均衡的組態方式可能更為有效。此外，持有美元多頭頭寸可以避險美國利率上行和關稅擴大風險，進一步支援美國投資者對海外債券和股票敞口進行套期保值。

通過期權保護尾部風險的策略在2024年已被證明有效，而這一策略在2025年仍具吸引力。大選後股票波動率下降，使得通過看漲期權再次獲得美國資產的上行敞口變得更為容易。而對於更深度的下行風險（如歐洲股票因一些關鍵風險的脆弱性），期權價格也顯得更具吸引力。美元期權多頭（特別是針對歐元、加元、新加坡元和韓元）仍值得持有，而黃金和原油的上漲潛力則可避險部分關鍵尾部風險。

一些資產可能在美國政策風險未能兌現時受益。例如，2017年第一屆川普政府執政的第一年，新興市場的股票和貨幣表現優異。如果美國財政刺激力度較小，或貿易議程更加集中化，新興市場中風險反映最顯著的部分可能再次得到緩解。在投資組合中適度組態這類潛在的上行機會也具有一定意義。

更廣泛的市場結果區間意味著，2025年資產波動率的任何下降可能是增加避險頭寸的良機。 (企業改革與發展)