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核心要點：
1.貿易協議的博弈分析：從博弈論看，當前達成全面協議（消除美國貿易逆差、取消除10%雙邊關稅外所有關稅）並非最優。部分協議（如降關稅至65%）中國或受益，但美國會拒絕。美國同意協議需至少獲當前受益的1690億美元（通過更多關稅或貿易），若部分協議中中國出口降幅＜40%、美國出口降幅＜20%，70%關稅的部分協議對雙方更優。
2.關稅決策與美國目標：川普政府關稅數字非隨意設定，65%關稅提議有計算依據。此前認為協議不可行是假設雙方貿易降30%，現調整為中國出口降幅是美國兩倍，並考慮雙方豁免（如中國1000億美元消費品出口僅征20%關稅，美國400億美元出口免稅）。
美國在關稅水平與貿易量間權衡，川普欲征足夠關稅免低收入人群聯邦所得稅（免75%需2360億，免50%需512億，可通過60%關稅實現），但按消除逆差思路，這些目標難實現。60%關稅下美對中仍有578億美元逆差（含關稅），但優於當前2900億美元。
3.談判前景與市場影響：貿易影響不明，雙方等待更清晰資料，短期內難達成協議。雙方對周末協議期望低，7⽉31⽇90天期限前難解決，市場或回4⽉9日水平施壓領導人。若當前145%關稅下貿易降80%，雙方轉65%關稅體制最優，但除非貿易戰影響顯現或中國出口降80%，否則難進展，預計中國出口數月內顯影響。研究缺陷是假設美中出口損失相同（實際中國降幅是美國兩倍，後續需調整資料）
沃頓模型預測，145%關稅下2025年中國出口降61.1%，此時中國支付關稅等於對美出口價值，此為消逆差最優關稅水平，降65%美仍有651億美元逆差，美中均適應當前體制，無理由改變。儘管近期有動向，美中貿易協議仍遙不可及。
雙方認為能低成本贏貿易戰，市場將提醒xx代價（川普曾因市場成本讓步）。7⽉8⽇90天寬限期臨近，市場更緊張，仍處CGTSPOLL訊號顯示市場走低的窗口期（6⽉6日結束，除非新訊號），因對貿易協議不切實際的期望，市場回升，波動和偏度下降，是調整避險策略以在夏季重新測試和突破低點的機會。
完整翻譯：
CitiPoint Asia: What We Expect From The US-China TradeNegotiations This Weekend花旗亞洲：我們對本周末美中貿易談判的預期
MACRO: WHAT WE EXPECT FROM THE US-CHINA TRADE NEGOTIATIONS THIS
WEEKEND
宏觀：我們對本周末美中貿易談判的預期
Ahead of this weekend’s trade negotiations in Geneva we update our work from 24 April when we addressed the question of whether an interm deal between China and the USA, one which could see a lowering of tariffs, was possible. Since our earlier piece, we have continued to refine our methodology and have been making more progress on understanding this problem. We have learnt from the UK trade deal, for example, that even a “trade deal” involves the payment of a 10% tariff and more exports for the US with limited imports. We look at whether it is optimal for both sides tocut tariffs and what that optimal level could be.
在本周末日內瓦貿易談判前夕，我們更新了4⽉24日的研究內容，當時我們探討了中美之間達成一項可能降低關稅的臨時協議是否可行。自我們之前的文章發表以來，我們不斷完善研究方法，在理解這個問題上取得了更多進展。例如，從英美貿易協定中我們瞭解到，即使是一項“貿易協定” 也涉及10% 的關稅支付，且美國出口增加，進口有限。我們研究了雙方削減關稅是否是最優選擇，以及最優的關稅水平可能是多少。
From our Game Theory perspective, we assume that in the current environment US exports to China fall 30% while Chinese exports to the US fall 60%. This costs China $42bn while the US gains $169bn. In the event of a trade deal, we assume that US exports to China falls 10% and Chinese exports to the US fall 20%. For the trade deal to be done, we still expect the US to demand that the trade deficit will be eliminated - currently the US has, including tariffs, got 54.1% of the bilateral trade. The US is also collecting $249.2bn in tariffs, money that the Government is going to be reluctant to give up. In the event of a further breakdown we expect US exports to China to fall 40% and Chinese exports to the USA to fall by 80%. We also assume all carveouts are eliminated in a further breakdown of relations and full tariffs are again applied to all exports.
從博弈論的角度來看，我們假設在當前環境下，美國對中國的出口下降30%，而中國對美國的出口下降60%。這使中國損失420億美元，而美國獲利1690億美元。如果達成貿易協議，我們假設美國對中國的出口下降10%，中國對美國的出口下降20%。為達成貿易協議，我們預計美國仍會要求消除貿易逆差—— 目前包括關稅在內，美國在雙邊貿易中佔比54.1%。美國還徵收了2492億美元的關稅，政府不太願意放棄這筆收入。如果談判進一步破裂，我們預計美國對中國的出口將下降40%，中國對美國的出口將下降80%。我們還假設，在關係進一步破裂的情況下，所有豁免將被取消，所有出口將再次被徵收全額關稅。
In this scenario it is not optimal to reach a trade deal which would involve the removal of all tariffs except 10% bilateral tariffs and which would involve the elimination of the US trade deficit
在這種情況下，達成一項取消除10% 雙邊關稅以外的所有關稅並消除美國貿易逆差的貿易協議並非最優選擇。
But what about if we examine the scenario where instead of a full deal, a partial deal, is achieved which would involve a reduction of tariffs to 65%, as has been proposed. Is this optimal? China would benefit from a partial deal even if it meant that their exports fell by 40% and US exports fell 20%. However the US would reject this partial deal and so under these parameters a partial deal would be rejected
但如果我們考慮這樣一種情況，即不是達成全面協議，而是如提議的那樣達成一項將關稅降⾄65% 的部分協議，情況會怎樣呢？這是最優選擇嗎？即使這意味著中國出口下降40%，美國出口下降20%，中國仍能從部分協議中受益。然而，美國會拒絕這項部分協議，因此在這些條件下，部分協議將被否決。
WhatwouldgettheUStoagreetoatradedeal?TheUSmustgetatleastthe$169bnthatitis benefiting from currently either frommore tariffs or more trade - there is a trade off.
怎樣才能讓美國同意一項貿易協議呢？美國必須至少獲得目前從更多關稅或更多貿易中獲得的1690億美元收益—— 這需要權衡取捨。
We find that this may be possible if on a partial deal Chinese exports fall less than 40% and US exports fall less than 20%. Then a partial deal on a 70% tariff is preferable than the current state form both sides and a deal could be done. Are these falls in demand realistic?
我們發現，如果在部分協議下，中國出口降幅小於40%，美國出口降幅小於20%，這或許是可行的。那麼，對於雙方而言，70% 關稅的部分協議比現狀更可取，協議也有可能達成。這些需求降幅現實嗎？
WeestimateChineseexports willfall 25% witha tariff of 70% and USexports willfall by12.5%. With those parameters a partial deal is preferable to the current state even at a tariffof60%. Iftrade fallsby more than that then a partial trade deal isnotpossible.
我們預計，在70% 的關稅下，中國出口將下降25%，美國出口將下降12.5%。在這些條件下，即使關稅為60%，部分協議也比現狀更可取。如果貿易降幅超過這個幅度，部分貿易協議就無法達成。
Againitseemsthat,ratherthanjustpullingoutrandomfigures,theTrumpadministrationhas reached its conclusions after careful calculations. The 65%tariffproposal is not an accident.
似乎川普政府並非隨意給出資料，而是經過仔細計算後得出結論。65% 的關稅提議並非偶然。
So why did we conclude on 24Apr that a trade deal was not possible? On that occasion we assumed a 30% drop in bilateral trade on both sides. With those numbers the pain was not significant enough. We now assume that the percentage decline in Chinese exports is twice that ofthe US. We also take intoaccountthecarve-outsthatbothsideshavegrantedwhichmeanthat$100bnofChinese exportsofconsumergoodsareonlytariffedat20% and$40bnofUSexportsaretariff-free.The parametersof thegamehavechangedsince24 Apreventhoughitappearsthattherulesremain similar.
那麼，為什麼我們在4⽉24日得出貿易協議無法達成的結論呢？當時我們假設雙方雙邊貿易都下降30%。按那些資料，影響還不夠大。我們現在假設中國出口降幅是美國的兩倍。我們還考慮了雙方給予的豁免情況，即1000億美元的中國消費品出口僅徵收20% 的關稅，400億美元的美國出口免稅。自4⽉24日以來，博弈的參數已經發生了變化，儘管規則看似相似。
For the US there is a trade - off between level of tariff collected and amount of trade to be done and hence a minimization of the economic impact. President Trump will want to collect enough tariffs to eliminate federal income taxes for the bottom 75% of the population which would cost $236bn. To eliminate federal income taxes for the bottom 50% of taxpayers would cost just $51.2bn which can be paid with 60% tariffs.
對美國來說，在徵收的關稅水平和貿易量之間存在權衡，目的是將經濟影響降至最低。川普總統希望徵收足夠的關稅，以便為75% 的低收入人群免除聯邦所得稅，這將花費2360億美元。為50% 的低收入納稅人免除聯邦所得稅只需花費512億美元，這可以通過60% 的關稅來實現。
These objectives do not appear to be achievable in line with the idea of eliminating the trade deficit.That still requires, with our estimates of the tariff impact on exports, tariffs of 120%. With a 60% tariff the US will still be running a trade deficit of $57.8bn with China, inclusive of tariffs. Not quite zero but much better than the $290bn trade deficit that the US is currently running.
這些目標似乎無法按照消除貿易逆差的思路實現。根據我們對關稅對出口影響的估計，要實現這一點仍需120% 的關稅。徵收60% 的關稅時，美國對中國仍會有578 億美元的貿易逆差（含關稅）。雖非零逆差，但比美國目前2900億美元的貿易逆差要好得多。
While it is unclear exactly what the trade impact is, both sides are likely to wait until it becomes a lot clearer how much trade actually falls and who will lose more - this key figure is hard to ascertain at the moment and that probably precludes a trade deal. For now both sides will play a dance to assess what the other side is thinking.
由於目前尚不清楚貿易的確切影響，雙方可能會等待，直到貿易實際降幅以及誰的損失更大變得更加明朗—— 目前這一關鍵資料難以確定，這很可能阻礙貿易協議的達成。目前雙方會相互試探，以揣測對方的想法。
With President Trump on a visit to the Middle East and the top authority in Russia, it seems that neither leadership are holding out much hope for an agreement this weekend. The best we can hope for is that there are talks to hold more talks - it is unlikely that any resolution will be found before the end of the 90 - day period on 31 July and as markets start to realize that they head back to the levels they were at on 9 Apr to put pressure on the leaderships not to increase tariffs or escalate the trade war
川普總統出訪中東和俄羅斯高層，似乎雙方領導人都對本周末達成協議不抱太大希望。我們所能期望的最好結果是開啟更多談判的對話——在7 ⽉31⽇90天期限結束前不太可能找到解決方案，隨著市場逐漸意識到這一點，其將回到4⽉9日的水平，以此向領導人施壓，避免持聽筒高關稅或使貿易戰升級。
MACRO: IS A REDUCTION IN BILATERAL US - CHINA TARIFFS TO 65% POSSIBLE?
宏觀：美中雙邊關稅降至65% 是否可行？
MarketsralliedearlierthisweekwhenPresidentTrumpsuggestedthathewasopentocuttingthe tariffon Chinese exports. The Wall Street Journal suggested that the tariffcouldbe cut to 65%.
本周早些時候，川普總統表示願意削減對中國出口商品的關稅，市場隨即上揚。《華爾街日報》稱關稅可能降至65%。
Using the Game Theory approach that we have presented over the past few days we can see whether it is optimal to cut tariffs to 65% and how the game looks. This framework is useful in nassessing whether any of the different outcomes mooted make any sense.
運用我們過去幾天提出的博弈論方法，我們可以分析將關稅降至65% 是否為最優選擇，以及這種情況下的博弈態勢。這一框架有助於評估各種提議的不同結果是否合理。
Witha65% tariff on bothsidesand bilateral tradefalling30% inthecurrentregime,itisstillnotoptimal for China or the USA to reach a deal. Moving to a position with 65% tariffs would be sub - optimalfor bothsides.The US would give up$293bn in returnof $108bn whileChina wouldgive upalossof$7bnforalossof$65bn.
在當前體制下，若雙方都徵收65% 的關稅且雙邊貿易下降30%，對中國和美國來說，達成協議仍非最優選擇。進入65% 關稅的局面，對雙方而言都並非最佳。美國將放棄2930億美元以換取1080億美元，而中國將從損失70億美元變為損失650億美元。
However these numbersand the optimaloutcomeschangedramatically basedon theexpectedfall in bilateral trade.So long as bilateral trade has not reached a floor it remains optimalfor bothsidesto not reach a deal, even this intermediate 65%tariffdeal.
然而，這些數字和最優結果會隨著雙邊貿易預期降幅的變化而大幅變動。只要雙邊貿易尚未觸底，對雙方來說，不達成協議（即使是65% 關稅的中間協議）仍是最優選擇。
What we find is that ifbilateral trade falls by 80% in the current145% tariffregime then it becomesoptimal for both sides to do a deal and move to a 65%tariffregime.
我們發現，在當前145% 的關稅體制下，如果雙邊貿易下降80%，那麼對雙方來說，達成協議並轉向65% 的關稅體制將是最優選擇。
Both sides will either need to see bilateral trade falling that amount or see the potential risk of trade falling by that amount to come to the negotiating table. When this occurs there are a number of consequences:
雙方要麼看到雙邊貿易下降上述幅度，要麼意識到貿易有下降該幅度的潛在風險，才會坐到談判桌前。一旦出現這種情況，會產生一系列結果：
Firstlyitbecomesoptimalforbothsidestomovefromthe 145%tariff regimeto a65%tariff regime.
首先，對雙方來說，從145% 的關稅體制轉向65% 的關稅體制將是最優選擇。
Secondly even though appear to be two Nash equilibria (Deal, Deal) and (No Deal, No Deal) the (Deal, Deal) equilibria is dominant both individually and collectively (37 > 13 and -169 > -309 while -132 > -296).
其次，儘管似乎存在兩個納什均衡（達成協議，達成協議）和（未達成協議，未達成協議），但（達成協議，達成協議）均衡在個體和總體層面都佔優（37>13，-169> -309，-132> -296 ）。
Moving to the 65% tariff regime it then becomes optimal to reach a full deal which would involve the rebalance of the trade deficit.
轉向65% 的關稅體制後，達成一項涉及貿易逆差再平衡的全面協議將是最優選擇。
This appears to be a balloon that the US administration is floating but until the impact of the trade war on exports becomes apparent or Chinese exports actually fall by 80%, it is unlikely that any progress will be made. We expect Chinese exports to start showing the impact of the trade war within a few months.
這似乎是美國政府放出的試探氣球，但在貿易戰對出口的影響顯現出來，或者中國出口實際下降80% 之前，不太可能取得任何進展。我們預計，中國出口將在幾個月內開始顯現貿易戰的影響。
One of the flaws in this work is that it assumes that both US and Chinese exports suffers the same loss - this is almost certainly not the case. The initial numbers show that Chinese exports are falling by twice the percentage amount that US numbers are. We need to adjust the numbers to take this into account in future pieces
這項研究的一個缺陷是，它假設美中出口遭受的損失相同—— 幾乎可以肯定並非如此。初步資料顯示，中國出口下降幅度是美國的兩倍。在後續研究中，我們需要調整資料以考慮這一點。
We continue to find that the Trump tariff numbers are not accidents but there appears to be some intuitive methodology in reaching them. We use a model from Wharton University which projects the impact on Chinese exports of US tariffs and the revenue it will raise
我們不斷髮現，川普的關稅資料並非隨意設定，確定這些資料似乎有一定的內在邏輯方法。我們採用了沃頓商學院的一個模型，該模型預測美國關稅對中國出口的影響及其帶來的收入。
The Wharton model projects a 61.1% drop in Chinese exports in 2025 when tariffs of 145% are applied. At 145% tariffs we find that the tariffs that China will be paying are equivalent to the value of its exports to the USA.
沃頓模型預測，若徵收145% 的關稅，2025 年中國出口將下降61.1%。在145% 的關稅水平下，我們發現中國支付的關稅金額相當於其對美出口的價值。
After exchanging the bilateral tariffs we find that this is the optimal tariff level at which the trade deficit is effectively eliminated. Reducing the tariffs to 65% would leave the USA with a trade deficit of $65.1bn and would not allow the USA to achieve its objective of eliminating the trade deficit. Again we find that the USA is quite comfortable with the current regime, as is China, so despite the damage to bilateral exports there does not seem to be any rationale for changing it.
在互換雙邊關稅後，我們發現這是能有效消除貿易逆差的最優關稅水平。將關稅降至65%會使美國仍有651億美元的貿易逆差，無法實現消除貿易逆差的目標。我們再次發現，美國和中國都對當前體制相當適應，所以儘管雙邊出口受到損害，但似乎沒有理由改變它。
Despite the recent moves in the past few days, a trade dealoranytradedeal,especially withChinais quite a long way away.
儘管過去幾天有一些動向，但達成貿易協議，或者說任何貿易協議，尤其是與中國的貿易協議，仍遙遙無期。
Within our Catastrophe Framework both sides have seen an increase in the threat faced from the other prompting both sides to move to the “Attack” plane.
在我們的突變理論框架內，雙方都察覺到來自對方的威脅增加，這促使雙方都採取“攻擊”策略。
Both sides think that they can win the war at relatively low cost to themselves. It will be up to markets to remind the leaders of the cost of the trade war. When this happens then the leaders will move to a more neutral stance and back down. It is interesting to view President Trump’s actions on
the initial setting of tariffs from 2 Apr to 11 Apr within this context as well as the market responsesn to his attacks on Fed Chair Powell. In both cases President Trump backed down when faced with a significant market cost
雙方都認為自己能以相對較低的成本贏得這場貿易戰。只有市場才能讓領導人認識到貿易戰的代價。當這種情況發生時，領導人會採取更中立的立場並做出讓步。從這個角度來看，川普總統在4⽉2⽇⾄11日最初設定關稅時的行動，以及市場對他抨擊聯準會主席鮑爾的反應，都很有意思。在這兩種情況下，川普總統在面臨巨大的市場成本時都做出了讓步。
We expect markets to get more nervous as we approach the end of the 90 - day grace period on 8 July, just three days before the expiry of the NKY July options and two days before the expiry of the Kospi July options. We are still within the 40 - day window when the CGTSPOLL signal indicates the market lower - this window will end on 6 June unless a fresh signal is triggered
隨著7⽉8⽇90 天寬限期臨近結束，我們預計市場會更加緊張，這一天距離日經指數7⽉期權到期僅3 天，距離韓國綜合股價指數7月期權到期僅2 天。目前我們仍處於CGTSPOLL訊號顯示市場走低的40 天窗口期內，除非觸發新訊號，否則該窗口期將於6⽉6日結束。
The rally back up to “fair value” in our fiscal deficit framework on misguided hopes of a traden deal and the fall in volatility and skew is an opportunity to reset hedges looking for a re - test and break of the lows over the summer.
因對貿易協議抱有不切實際的期望，在我們的財政赤字框架內，市場回升至“公允價值”，波動性和偏度下降，這是一個重新調整避險策略的機會，以便在夏季重新測試並突破低點。 (機構調研記)