信任金融機構的文化差異Joe 盧, CFA | 2025年11月1日摘要多數台灣民眾傾向信任大型銀行，因為文化規範和嚴格的監管，培養了對老牌金融機構的信心。相較之下，多數美國人對各大銀行抱持懷疑態度，尤其在2008年後，利益衝突和不當銷售有毒抵押貸款證券的事件，暴露了銀行激勵機制與客戶利益的不一致。此反彈促使多數美國人轉向獨立、具備信託責任、以費用為基礎的註冊投資顧問(RIA)，這類顧問強調透明度和客戶利益一致。台灣的銀行主導了基金分銷和零售投資管理。儘管金管會有嚴格的規定和必要的揭露要求，但過去的案例顯示利益衝突仍可能發生。對台灣散戶投資者的啟示是「信任，但要驗證」：確認您顧問的信託責任和薪酬結構、避免過於複雜的產品、尋求第二意見，並積極參與財務決策。台灣第二大城——高雄市的天際線。此城市近期啟動了一個財富管理示範區，旨在吸引國際金融機構進駐超過700人已在我們的LINE上追蹤。加入我們，即可獲得我們的趨勢指標矩陣™ 市場監察員！當我與台灣一般投資者交談時，我注意到一個顯著的差異，那就是他們對金融機構的信任程度。在台灣，大型銀行和知名金融品牌享有很高的聲譽和公眾信心。許多台灣投資者本能地相信大型銀行能安全地管理他們的資金並提供建議，這與美國形成鮮明對比。在2008年金融危機後，美國民眾對大型銀行的信任度急劇下降，至今仍相對較低。舉例來說，世界經濟論壇在2015年的一項調查中，美國公民對其銀行體系的信心僅排名第49位（英國則為第89位）——這反映了美國人在2008年後如何對銀行失去信任[1]。事實上，到2008年底，只有約20%的美國人對美國銀行抱有高度信心[2]，這與過去幾十年相比是急劇的下降。公眾對銀行信任度隨時間的變化（美國 vs. 台灣）資料來源：Gallup, Business Insider從文化上講，美國人通常為「小人物」喝采，並對大型機構抱持懷疑，特別是當他們懷疑這些機構可能將利潤置於民眾之上時。相較之下，在台灣，社會規範傾向於尊重權威和老牌機構。集體主義和較高的權力距離等文化因素，可能會促使人們對知名銀行產生更大的信任。關於東亞金融行為的研究發現，「信任」是消費者的一個關鍵因素，並受到集體主義文化的顯著影響[3]。一項針對台灣和南韓銀行保險業務銷售的研究表明，消費者從其銀行購買金融產品的意願，受到感知價值、形象、滿意度和信任的驅動——且值得注意的是，高度集體主義的文化背景增強了這些銀行關係中的信任和滿意度[3][4]。簡言之，台灣投資者往往對大型金融品牌抱持「姑且相信」的態度，假設它們會正當行事。台灣穩定的銀行業環境強化了這種對老牌銀行的信心；本地銀行受到嚴格監管，且普遍未經歷過西方那種規模的倒閉事件。因此，許多台灣人將大銀行視為安全、信譽卓越且標準高的機構，值得他們的信賴。然而，文化上的信任可能是一把雙面刃。盲目地聽從大型機構，可能會使投資者較不傾向於質疑建議或注意到利益衝突。在美國，慘痛的經驗教會了投資者要更加謹慎。美國人清楚地記得，華爾街的巨頭們並非總是能對得起人們賦予他們的信任——這個教訓值得台灣投資者客觀地審視。2008年危機：利益衝突侵蝕了美國的信任2008年的次貸危機是一個分水嶺，粉碎了美國大眾對大型銀行的信任。主要的銀行和投資機構被發現從事損害其客戶利益的自我交易和利益衝突行為。一個明顯的例子是，一些銀行明知抵押貸款支持證券及相關產品品質低劣，卻仍將其產品化並出售給投資者——包括它們自己的財富管理客戶。在美國司法部的和解協議中，高盛(Goldman Sachs)承認在2000年代中期出售的證券存在誤導性，背後包含了有毒抵押貸款[5]。聯邦調查人員指出，銀行業在銷售這些產品時普遍存在「欺詐行為」[6]。本質上，幾家大型銀行正在承銷高風險的抵押貸款債券，同時又將其作為安全的投資品，向信任它們的客戶推銷。當這些證券價值崩潰時，不僅造成了巨大的損失，也摧毀了公眾對銀行諮詢服務誠信的信心。正如一份報告總結的那樣，美國的銀行揮霍了信任，它們向客戶保證有瑕疵的抵押貸款債券是穩健的——而與此同時，銀行卻從銷售中獲利[5][6]。次貸危機的慘敗使美國人敏銳地意識到，大型銀行的利益可能與個人投資者的利益產生衝突。美國投資者逐漸意識到，大銀行或券商的「理財顧問」，不過是穿著體面西裝的銷售代表——通常靠佣金來推銷銀行的產品或達成業績目標。這種利益衝突在許多傳統的財富管理模式中是固有的。正如世界經濟論壇指出的，「銷售金融產品的佣金激勵制度，會產生不利於投資者的利益衝突。」[7] 受僱於銀行的顧問可能會傾向於推薦能最大化其費用或其雇主利潤的產品，而非真正適合客戶的選擇。一種常見的做法是「雙重收費」(double-dipping)，即公司的內部顧問銷售公司自家的基金或結構型產品；不出所料，這種設置構成了「固有的利益衝突」，因為如果銀行能引導客戶購買其自家的高利潤產品，它就能賺取更多利潤[8]。在2008年之前的幾年裡，此類衝突猖獗——而許多美國客戶為此付出了代價。RIA成長 vs. 銀行體系券商市佔率 (2008–2025)資料來源：Advisor Perspectives這些揭露所引發的反彈，深刻地改變了美國的財富管理格局。投資者開始尋求與華爾街大型企業無關的獨立顧問和替代方案。一個很好的例子是獨立的註冊投資顧問(RIA)和只收費(fee-only)的理財規劃師的崛起。與銀行的傳統經紀人不同，美國的RIA以信託人(fiduciaries)的身份運作，在法律上有義務將客戶的利益置於首位。這種模式通常向客戶收取固定或基於資產的費用，而非佣金，對那些被大銀行具衝突性的建議所傷害的美國人很有吸引力。事實上，RIA通路已見到爆炸性的增長。到2023年，獨立RIA管理的資產已翻倍至近20兆美元，成為美國財富管理中增長最快的部分[9]。投資者正優先考慮「費用透明度和信託責任建議」，並獎勵那些與其利益一致的顧問[10]。簡言之，美國對「大公司」的信任在2008年受到重創，許多投資者的反應是給予新進者和獨立顧問一個贏得他們信任的機會。「信任，但要驗證」的健康懷疑精神，現已深植於許多美國人選擇理財顧問的方式中。美國理財顧問模式比較資料來源：SEC台灣對大型銀行的信任 – 標準高，但須提防利益衝突在台灣，環境則大不相同。本地銀行在2008年並未引發本土的金融危機，且它們普遍保持著穩健的紀錄。台灣的監管機構對銀行實施嚴格的監督，整體金融體系也保持穩定和韌性[11][12]。這種強力的監督，無疑有助於民眾與主要銀行打交道時的安心感。台灣的財富管理市場主要由大型銀行主導——這是信任的一個明顯指標。在台灣，超過80%的共同基金投資是透過銀行的分銷通路銷售的，遠遠超過任何獨立的理財顧問或券商[13]。對許多台灣投資者而言，他們尋求投資產品或建議的第一站（且往往是唯一一站）就是他們的銀行。依賴銀行的客戶關係經理或理財顧問，來指導從保險到共同基金等一切事務是很常見的。人們的假設是，一家大型、知名的銀行會提供穩健的建議，並保障個人的利益。台灣2008年後金管會監管查核清單資料來源：金管會法規這種信任關係，加上嚴格的監管，至今為止防止了像華爾街崩盤那樣規模的重大醜聞。台灣的金融監督管理委員會（金管會）在許多方面對銀行實施了「更高的標準」。值得注意的是，在2008年後，金管會為財富管理引入了新的消費者保護規則。例如，頒布了《境外結構型商品管理規則》，以遏制複雜產品的不當銷售。現在，台灣的銀行必須以中文提供完整的風險揭露，明確告知投資者產品是否保本，甚至必須在錄音的情況下，向客戶大聲朗讀風險揭露文件[14]。這些措施突顯了監管機構理解濫用的可能性，並已採取行動，透過增加透明度和問責制來鞏固信任。本質上，銀行受到良好監督：銀行的任何私人財富顧問或信託經理，都被期望遵循嚴格的規程，這有助於維持公眾的信念，即「這家大銀行正為我做正確的事。」然而，高標準並不意味著零利益衝突。即使在台灣較為保守的銀行文化中，根本的激勵問題仍可能潛伏在表面之下。在2008年後的改革之前，台灣的銀行曾透過信託帳戶，在沒有太多監督的情況下，自由地向零售客戶銷售各式各樣的境外結構型票據和衍生性金融商品[15]。許多一般投資者從其銀行的財富管理部門購買了複雜的產品（如信用連結票據或結構型票據），卻未完全理解其風險。當全球危機來襲時，這些產品的價值暴跌，導致了重大的損失和爭議。事實上，在2000年至2013年間，台灣投資者就結構型票據的疑似不當銷售，提起了超過300件訴訟[16]。這波法律行動顯示，即使在台灣，一些銀行顧問也曾推銷客戶不理解或真正不需要的產品。此事件的後續影響促使監管機構收緊規則，如上所述，但它是一個警世故事：利益衝突確實存在——只是在壓力揭示它們之前，它們較不為人所見。此外，台灣主要銀行的私人銀行理專，通常仍是領取薪資並有銷售目標的員工，他們經常因分銷銀行核准的金融產品而獲得獎金或佣金。存在著一種推銷產品和達成銷售目標的內在壓力，這可能會使您收到的建議產生偏見。顧問或許並非公然欺詐，但他們可能會利用銀行享有盛譽的品牌來贏得您的信任——然後巧妙地引導您購買銀行想要銷售的投資產品，而偏離了您的最佳利益。當一位顧問將自己定位為由知名機構支持的專家時，心理上的影響力可能很強。簡言之，台灣的銀行享有良好的信譽與信任，且通常依法運作。然而，投資者應記住，銀行也是企業。一家大銀行的優先考量是其股東利益和實現獲利，這有時可能與客戶的最佳利益相衝突。具衝突性的建議——例如在一個更便宜的指數基金就能滿足需求的情況下，被推銷一個高費用的基金，或者被慫恿頻繁交易——如果投資者從不質疑其銀行的建議，就可能發生。從美國以及一些本地的經驗中學到的教訓是，健康的懷疑和盡職調查是必要的，即使是與一家信譽良好的銀行打交道時也一樣。信任，但要驗證。給台灣投資者的建議保持一種正式、分析性的態度，意味著在信任與謹慎之間取得平衡。以下是一些值得考慮的建議：驗證資格與信託責任： 確保您的理財顧問具備良好資格（尋找證照或執照），並詢問他們是否對您負有信託責任。在美國，RIA依法必須將客戶利益置於首位；在台灣，詢問顧問是獨立的，還是與銷售業績掛鉤。與真正合格的專業人士合作，意味著與一位將您的目標置於推銷產品之上的人合作。了解您的顧問如何獲得報酬： 務必釐清其激勵結構。如果您與銀行的財富管理部門打交道，他們是否因銷售某些基金或保險而賺取佣金或獎金？佣金制度本身就會造成利益衝突——正如一份全球分析所言，這種「激勵分銷商銷售對其自身有利的產品」而不是對投資者有利的產品[17]。盡可能考慮採用只收費模式的顧問（只需支付透明的費用）。此類顧問費用只由您支付報酬，而非由產品提供者支付，這促使他們以您的最佳利益為出發點行事[18]。警惕「好到不真實」的產品： 如果一位銀行顧問推薦一個承諾高報酬的複雜產品（例如結構型票據、奇異的衍生性金融商品，或任何您難以理解的投資），請暫停並仔細審視。低風險高報酬的產品並不存在；總有蹊蹺。要求以書面形式提供所有費用和風險。請記住，在2008年之前，許多投資者（包括在台灣）被推銷了表面上「安全」的高收益產品，而這些產品後來都崩盤了。不要猶豫提出尖銳的問題——如果解釋充滿專業術語，或者顧問對風險輕描淡寫，那就是一個警訊。分散您的建議來源： 正如您分散投資一樣，考慮分散您獲取建議的來源。您不必放棄您的銀行——但尋求獨立理財規劃師的第二意見，或自己做研究是明智之舉。外部顧問可能會提供不同的觀點，相互比較可以揭示您銀行的建議是否真的具有競爭力。在美國，獨立顧問之所以增長，是因為他們通常提供更客製化、以客戶為中心的建議[10][9]。在台灣，獨立顧問服務仍在興起，但您仍然可以諮詢那些不與銷售單一銀行產品掛鉤的持牌理財顧問。即使只是閱讀中立的研究報告（來自信譽良好的財經出版物或投資者教育材料），也能幫助您做出更明智的決定，而非僅僅依賴銀行的說詞。保持資訊靈通並積極參與： 說到底，這是您的錢。培養對您投資計畫和投資組合的基本理解。不要將所有思考都外包給顧問。監控您的帳戶和績效，如果發現任何不對勁之處（例如頻繁交易，或您不記得同意過的產品），應立即提出。一位值得信賴的顧問會歡迎您的參與和提問。俗話說，「信任是每天贏得的。」讓您的顧問透過透明和迅速的回應來贏得那份信任。如果您覺得他們在迴避問題或將銀行的利益置於您的利益之上，請準備好離開或將疑慮上報。透過遵循這些步驟，台灣投資者可以兼得兩全——利用主要銀行的強大金融基礎設施和專業知識，同時也保護自己免受潛在的利益衝突。對機構的健康信任是寶貴的，但它絕不應是盲目的。美國的經驗顯示了盲目信任的代價有多高，而一種平衡的方法——信任並驗證——則能帶來更好的結果。總而言之，在管理您的財富時，請保持正式和分析的態度：尊重專業人士的建議，但務必確保該建議真正與您自己的目標一致。憑藉審慎的懷疑和知識，您可以繼續從台灣信譽良好的銀行中受益，而不會成為其他市場中因銷售技巧勝過託管責任而出現的陷阱的受害者。務必確保您合作的對象是一位將您置於首位的合格專業人士，如此您才能在長期的財務道路上取得成功。資料來源：世界經濟論壇與Baker Tilly關於對銀行信任度的調查數據[1]; 蓋洛普關於美國對銀行信心的民意調查[2]。關於集體主義與東亞金融行為中信任度的研究[3][4]。美國司法部關於銀行對抵押貸款證券不實陳述的調查結果（高盛和解案）[5][6]。世界經濟論壇關於財富管理中利益衝突以及只收費顧問模式益處的報告[7][8][18][9]。高盛資產管理關於美國獨立RIA顧問崛起的洞察[10]。台灣金融產業報告：銀行在基金分銷中的主導地位[13]，金管會2008年後對結構型產品的監管措施[14]，以及台灣不當銷售案例的分析[15][16]。📲加入我們的專屬頻道，即可獲取我們的跨資產趨勢指標矩陣，以及專家嚴選的投資內容。💬透過LINE與我們聯繫，即可加入社群。如果您覺得這份研究有價值：👍為這篇文章按讚。📰追蹤此部落格，獲取最新的市場動態。➡️分享給其他關注美股和台股市場的投資者。本電子報僅供參考，不構成任何證券或資產類別的投資建議或買賣推薦。文中所表達的觀點為作者截至發布日期的觀點，如有變動，恕不另行通知。所呈現的資訊乃基於從相信可靠的來源所獲取的數據，但其準確性、完整性和及時性不作保證。過往表現並非未來結果的指標。投資涉及風險，包括可能損失本金。讀者在做出任何投資決策前，應諮詢其財務顧問。作者及相關實體可能持有本文所討論的資產或資產類別的部位。Trust in Big Banks: Taiwan’s Confidence vs. U.S. SkepticismCultural Differences in Trusting Financial InstitutionsBy Joe 盧, CFA | 2025-11-01Executive SummaryMost Taiwanese tend to trust big banks because cultural norms and strong regulation foster confidence in established institutions.In contrast, most Americans are skeptical of large banks, particularly after 2008, when conflicts of interest and the mis-selling of toxic mortgage securities laid bare incentive misalignment.The backlash drove most Americans toward independent, fiduciary, fee-based RIAs that emphasize transparency and client alignment.Taiwan’s banks dominate fund distribution and retail investment management. The FSC has strict rules and required disclosures, but past cases show that conflicts can still arise.The takeaway for retail investors in Taiwan is “trust but verify”: confirm the fiduciary duty and compensation of your advisor, avoid overly complicated products, seek second opinions, and stay actively involved in financial decisions.The skyline of Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s second-largest city. The city is home to a newly launched wealth management zone aimed at attracting international financial institutionsOne of the striking differences I notice when I talk to the average Taiwanese investor is the amount of trust they have in their financial institutions. In Taiwan, major banks and big-name financial brands enjoy a strong reputation and public confidence. Many Taiwanese investors instinctively trust big banks as safe stewards of their money and advice. This contrasts starkly with the U.S., where public trust in big banks plummeted after the 2008 financial crisis and remains relatively low. For example, a World Economic Forum survey in 2015 ranked the United States just 49th (and the UK 89th) in citizens’ confidence in their banking system – a reflection of how Americans lost trust in banks after 2008[1]. In fact, by late 2008 only about 20% of Americans had high confidence in U.S. banks[2], a drastic drop from prior decades.% of Public That Trust Banks Over Time (U.S. vs. Taiwan)Source: Gallup, Business InsiderCulturally, Americans often cheer the “little guy” and harbor skepticism toward large institutions, especially if they suspect those institutions might put profits over people. In Taiwan, by contrast, societal norms tend to respect authority and established institutions. Cultural factors like collectivism and higher power distance may encourage greater trust in well-known banks. Research on East Asian financial behavior finds that “trust” is a key factor for consumers and is significantly influenced by collectivist culture[3]. In a study of banks selling insurance in Taiwan and South Korea, consumers’ willingness to buy financial products from their bank was driven by perceived value, image, satisfaction and trust – and notably, the high collectivist cultural context boosted trust and satisfaction in those banking relationships[3][4].In short, Taiwanese investors often give the benefit of the doubt to big financial brands, assuming they will act properly. This faith in established banks is reinforced by Taiwan’s stable banking environment; local banks are closely regulated and generally did not experience failures on the scale seen in the West. Many Taiwanese therefore see big banks as safe, reputable and held to high standards, deserving of their confidence.However, cultural trust can be a double-edged sword. Blindly deferring to large institutions may leave investors less inclined to question advice or notice conflicts of interest. In the U.S., painful experiences have taught investors to be more wary. Americans vividly remember that Wall Street giants did not always justify the trust placed in them – a lesson that Taiwanese investors would do well to examine objectively.The 2008 Crisis: Conflicts of Interest Erode U.S. TrustThe 2008 subprime mortgage crisis was a watershed moment that shattered public trust in big banks in America. Major banks and investment houses were found to have engaged in self-dealing and conflicts of interest that harmed their clients. A glaring example was how some banks packaged and sold mortgage-backed securities and related products to investors – including their own wealth management clients – despite knowing those loans were of poor quality. In a U.S. Justice Department settlement, Goldman Sachs admitted to misleading investors about the toxic mortgages backing securities it sold in the mid-2000s[5]. Federal investigators noted the “pervasiveness of the banking industry’s fraudulent practices in selling” these products[6]. In essence, several big banks were underwriting risky mortgage bonds and simultaneously marketing them as safe investments to trusting customers. When those securities collapsed in value, it not only inflicted huge losses but also destroyed public confidence in the integrity of banks’ advice. As one report summarized, banks in the U.S. squandered trust by assuring clients that flawed mortgage bonds were sound – all while the banks profited from the sales[5][6].The subprime fiasco made Americans acutely aware of how the interests of large banks can diverge from the interests of individual investors. U.S. investors learned that a “financial advisor” at a big bank or brokerage was little more than a sales representative in a nice suit – often paid on commission to push the bank’s own products or meet quotas. This conflict of interest is inherent in many traditional wealth management models. As the World Economic Forum notes, “Commission-based incentives for selling financial products create conflicts of interest that work against investors.”[7] Advisors employed by banks may be tempted to recommend products that maximize their fees or their employer’s profits, rather than truly suitable choices for the client. One common practice is “double-dipping,” where a firm’s in-house advisers sell the firm’s proprietary funds or structured products; unsurprisingly, this setup poses an “inherent conflict of interest,” since the bank earns more if it can steer clients into its own high-margin products[8]. In the years leading up to 2008, such conflicts were rampant – and many U.S. clients paid the price.RIA Growth vs. Bank Wirehouse Share (2008–2025)Source: Advisor PerspectivesThe backlash from these revelations has profoundly altered the U.S. wealth management landscape. Investors began seeking out independent advisers and alternative approaches not tied to the big Wall Street firms. A great example is the rise of independent Registered Investment Advisors (RIAs) and fee-only financial planners. Unlike traditional brokers at banks, RIAs in the U.S. operate as fiduciaries, legally obliged to put clients’ interests first. This model, often charging clients flat or asset-based fees instead of commissions, appealed to Americans burnt by conflicted advice from large U.S. banks. In fact, the RIA channel has seen explosive growth. By 2023, independent RIAs had doubled their assets under management to nearly $20 trillion, becoming the fastest-growing segment of U.S. wealth management[9]. Investors are prioritizing “fee transparency and fiduciary advice” and rewarding advisors who align with their interests[10]. In short, America’s trust in “the big guys” was badly damaged in 2008, and many investors responded by giving newcomers and independent advisors a chance to earn their trust instead. The cultural ethos of healthy skepticism—“trust, but verify”—is now ingrained in how many Americans choose financial advisers.U.S. Financial Advisor Model ComparisonSource: SECTaiwan’s Trust in Big Banks – High Standards, but Beware ConflictsIn Taiwan, the environment is quite different. Local banks did not produce a home-grown financial crisis in 2008, and they generally maintain a solid track record. Taiwan’s regulatory authorities enforce rigorous oversight on banks, and the overall financial system has remained stable and resilient[11][12]. This strong oversight no doubt contributes to the public’s comfort in dealing with major banks. Wealth management in Taiwan is largely dominated by big banks – a telling indicator of trust. Over 80% of mutual fund investments in Taiwan are sold through banks’ distribution channels, far outpacing any independent financial advisors or brokers[13]. For many Taiwanese investors, their first (and often only) stop for investment products or advice is their bank. It’s common to rely on a bank’s relationship manager or financial consultant for guidance on everything from insurance to mutual funds. The assumption is that a large, well-known bank will offer sound advice and safeguard one’s interests.Taiwan Post-2008 FSC Regulation ChecklistSource: FSC RegulationsThis trusting relationship, combined with strict regulation, has so far prevented major scandals on the scale of Wall Street’s meltdown. Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission (FSC) holds banks to a “higher standard” in many respects. Notably, after 2008 the FSC introduced new consumer protection rules for wealth management. For instance, the Regulations Governing Offshore Structured Products were enacted to curb mis-selling of complex products. Banks in Taiwan must now provide full risk disclosure in Mandarin Chinese, explicitly inform investors whether a product is principal-guaranteed, and even read the risk disclosure documents out loud to the client while recording the conversation[14]. These measures underscore that regulators understand the potential for abuse and have moved to fortify trust by increasing transparency and accountability. In essence, the banks are well-policed: any private wealth advisor or trust manager in a bank is expected to follow stringent protocols, which helps maintain the public’s faith that “this large bank is doing right by me.”However, high standards don’t mean zero conflicts of interest. Even in Taiwan’s more conservative banking culture, the fundamental incentive problems can still lurk beneath the surface. Before the post-2008 reforms, Taiwanese banks freely sold a wide array of offshore structured notes and derivatives to retail clients without much oversight, often via trust accounts[15]. Many regular investors bought complex products (such as credit-linked notes or structured notes) from their banks’ wealth managers, not fully understanding the risks. When the global crisis hit, those products tanked in value, leading to significant losses and disputes. In fact, over 300 lawsuits were filed by Taiwanese investors between 2000 and 2013 over alleged mis-selling of structured notes[16]. This wave of legal action suggests that even in Taiwan, some bank advisors had been salespeople pushing products that customers didn’t understand or truly need. The fallout prompted regulators to tighten rules, as noted above, but it serves as a cautionary tale: the conflicts of interest did exist – they were just less visible until stress revealed them. Additionally, a private banking officer in a major Taiwanese bank is still typically a salaried employee with sales targets, often receiving bonuses or commissions for distributing the bank’s approved financial products. There is an inherent pressure to move product and meet sales goals, which can bias the advice you receive. The advisor may not be outright fraudulent, but they may leverage the bank’s prestigious brand to earn your trust – and then subtly steer you toward investments the bank wants to sell, and away from your best interests. Psychological influence can be strong when an advisor positions themselves as the expert backed by a big-name institution.In short, Taiwanese banks enjoy a reservoir of goodwill and trust, and generally they operate ethically within the law. Yet investors should remember that banks are also businesses. A large bank’s priority is to its shareholders and its bottom line, which can at times conflict with a client’s best interest. Conflicted advice – such as being sold a high-fee fund when a cheaper index fund would do, or being urged to trade frequently – can happen if an investor never questions their bank’s recommendations. The lesson from both American and some local experiences is that healthy skepticism and due diligence are necessary, even when dealing with a reputable bank. Trust, but verify.Recommendations for Taiwanese InvestorsMaintaining a formal, analytical approach to your finances means balancing trust with caution. Here are some recommendations to consider:Verify Qualifications and Fiduciary Duty: Ensure your financial advisor is well qualified (look for certifications or licenses) and ask whether they have a fiduciary responsibility to you. In the U.S., RIAs must by law put client interests first; in Taiwan, ask if the advisor is independent or tied to sales quotas. Working with a truly qualified professional means someone who prioritizes your goals over pushing products.Understand How Your Advisor Gets Paid: Always clarify the incentive structure. If you deal with a bank wealth manager, are they earning commissions or bonuses for selling certain funds or insurance? Commission-based models inherently create conflicts – as one global analysis put it, they “incentivize distributors to sell products that benefit them financially” rather than the investor[17]. Whenever possible, consider advisers who use a fee-only model (you pay a transparent fee for advice). Such fee-based advisors are only paid by you, not by product providers, which encourages them to truly act in your best interest[18].Be Wary of “Too Good to Be True” Products: If a bank advisor recommends a complex product (e.g. a structured note, exotic derivative, or any investment you struggle to understand) promising high returns, pause and scrutinize it. High returns with low risk do not exist; there’s always a catch. Ask for all fees and risks in writing. Remember that before 2008, many investors (including in Taiwan) were sold ostensibly “safe” high-yield products that later collapsed. Don’t hesitate to ask tough questions – if the explanation is full of jargon or the advisor brushes off risks, that’s a red flag.Diversify Your Advice: Just as you diversify investments, consider diversifying where you get advice. You need not abandon your bank – but it can be wise to seek a second opinion from an independent financial planner or do your own research. An external advisor might offer a different perspective, and a bit of comparison can reveal if your bank’s recommendations are truly competitive. In the U.S., independent advisors have grown because they often provide more customized, client-centric advice[10][9]. In Taiwan, independent advisory services are still emerging, but you can still consult licensed financial consultants who aren’t tied to selling one bank’s products. Even reading up on neutral research (from reputable financial publications or investor education materials) can empower you to make more informed decisions rather than relying solely on a bank’s word.Stay Informed and Involved: Ultimately, it’s your money. Cultivate a basic understanding of your investment plan and portfolio. Don’t outsource all thinking to the adviser. Monitor your accounts and performance, and if something seems off (e.g. frequent trading, or products you don’t recall agreeing to), speak up immediately. A trustworthy advisor will welcome your involvement and questions. As the saying goes, “trust is earned daily.” Make your advisor earn that trust by being transparent and responsive. If you ever feel they are evading questions or prioritizing the bank’s interest over yours, be ready to walk away or escalate the concern.By following these steps, Taiwanese investors can enjoy the best of both worlds – leveraging the strong financial infrastructure and expertise of major banks, while also protecting themselves from potential conflicts of interest. Healthy trust in institutions is valuable, but it should never be blind. The U.S. experience shows how costly blind trust can be, whereas a balanced approach – trusting and verifying – leads to better outcomes.In summary, remain formal and analytical in managing your wealth: respect the advice of professionals, but always make sure that advice truly aligns with your own goals. With prudent skepticism and knowledge, you can continue to benefit from Taiwan’s reputable banks without falling victim to the pitfalls that come when salesmanship trumped stewardship in other markets. Always make sure you’re working with a qualified professional who puts you first, and you will be well-positioned to succeed financially in the long run.Sources:World Economic Forum & Baker Tilly survey data on trust in banks[1]; Gallup polling on U.S. confidence in banks[2].Research on collectivism and trust in East Asian financial behavior[3][4].U.S. Department of Justice findings on bank misrepresentation of mortgage securities (Goldman Sachs settlement)[5][6].World Economic Forum report on conflicts of interest in wealth management and the benefits of fee-only advisory models[7][8][18][9].Goldman Sachs Asset Management insights on the rise of independent RIA advisers in the U.S.[10].Taiwan financial industry reports: dominance of banks in fund distribution[13], FSC regulatory measures on structured products after 2008[14], and analysis of mis-selling cases in Taiwan[15][16].📲Join our private channels to gain access to our cross-asset Trend Conviction Matrix and expert-curated investment content.💬Connect with us on LINE to join the group.if you found this research valuable:👍'Like' this post.📰Follow this blog for new market updates.➡️Share it with others who track U.S. and Taiwan markets.This newsletter is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security or asset class. The views expressed are those of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. Information presented is based on data obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy, completeness, and timeliness are not guaranteed. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including the possible loss of principal. Readers should consult with their own financial advisors before making any investment decisions. The author and associated entities may hold positions in the assets or asset classes discussed herein.立即加入《Joe’s 華爾街脈動》LINE@官方帳號，獲得最新專欄資訊（點此加入）關於《Joe’s 華爾街脈動》鉅亨網特別邀請到擁有逾 22 年美國投資圈資歷、CFA 認證的機構操盤人 Joseph Lu 擔任專欄主筆。Joe 為台裔美國人，曾管理超過百億美元規模的基金資產，並為總資產高達數千億美元的多家頂級金融機構提供資產配置優化建議。Joe 目前帶領著由美國頂尖大學教授與博士組成的精英團隊，透過獨家開發的 "趨勢脈動 TrendFolios® 指標"，為台灣投資人深度解析全球市場脈動，提供美股市場第一手專業觀點，協助投資人掌握先機。

處於AI熱潮核心的各大企業，已相互投資了數十億美元。這引發了部分人士質疑AI的循環融資模式是否具有永續性。Joe 盧, CFA | 2025年10月26日 美東時間摘要美國巨頭企業之間的循環融資正驅動AI產業的擴張，導致成長指標膨脹，但終端用戶需求卻沒有相應成長。台灣的半導體與資料中心供應鏈雖從此資本中受益，但若美國AI投資放緩，將面臨重大風險。龐大的AI基礎設施支出與日益增長的電力需求，對美國和台灣的能源系統都構成壓力，壓縮了製造商的利潤。台灣對少數幾家美國巨頭企業的出口依賴，造成了高度的集中度風險，即使是強健的企業資產負債表也無法完全緩解。對投資者而言，監控AI資本支出動能、台灣出口訂單及能源成本，是區分投機性過剩與可持續結構性增長的關鍵。在「循環融資」結構的推動下，AI正驅動著現代史上最大規模的資本週期之一；在此結構中，輝達(Nvidia)、OpenAI、甲骨文(Oracle)、亞馬遜(Amazon)和Google等公司，同時扮演著投資者、供應商和客戶的多重角色。此一動態強化了企業估值，並創造了一個直接衝擊全球晶片製造中心——台灣的資本循環，這為台灣帶來了創紀錄的出口，但也累積了日益增加的風險曝險。本分析將探討當前AI熱潮與網路泡沫之間的相似與相異之處，評估這些資本流動最終將演變為可持續的增長，或是在自身的槓桿下崩潰，並重點關注其對台灣半導體產業的意涵。自我融通的人工智慧機器三家公司定義了當前的循環：輝達(Nvidia)、OpenAI和甲骨文(Oracle)。輝達(Nvidia)對OpenAI投資高達1,000億美元；OpenAI用這筆錢購買輝達的晶片；而為OpenAI提供3,000億美元雲端服務的甲骨文(Oracle)，則購買數百億美元的輝達GPU以履行該合約。每家公司都報告了更高的營收和上漲的股價，但相同的資本卻在一個封閉的系統內循環。彭博社(Bloomberg)將輝達(Nvidia)形容為「AI 的央行」，透過擴展流動性來維持此波熱潮。此結構與1990年代電信熱潮時的「供應商融資」(vendor financing)如出一轍，儘管AI的支出主要由內部現金流而非債務所資助。然而，這些關係使得營收看起來比實際更為強勁，因為資本是在一個封閉的網絡內循環，而非源自終端用戶，從而虛增了整個AI供應鏈的感知需求。此模式類似於戰後日本的「經連會」(keiretsu)或韓國的「財閥」(chaebol)，其交叉持股雖確保了供應穩定，卻也掩蓋了財務風險。台灣正處於此資本循環的正下方。台積電(TSMC)製造輝達的GPU，日月光(ASE)進行封裝，而緯創(Wistron)、廣達(Quanta)和英業達(Inventec)則組裝甲骨文(Oracle)和亞馬遜(Amazon)所部署的AI伺服器。美國巨頭企業之間的每一份新合約，都為台灣的工廠帶來一波訂單，但同時也將其營收與相同的融資週期綑綁在一起。此循環解釋了為何在AI商業化變現遲滯的情況下，台灣的半導體月出口額仍能達到歷史新高。這也解釋了其脆弱性：如果全球融資緊縮，同一個循環可能會反向解開，在美國股市反映經濟放緩之前，就已拖累台灣的出貨量。AI週期的脆弱基礎AI熱潮建立在一個脆弱的基礎上，投資者必須監控其三大核心脆弱性：資本密集度與商業化變現之間的差距、能源的物理性限制，以及供應鏈內部的高度風險集中。首要的脆弱性是支出與收入之間的不平衡。麥肯錫(McKinsey)預計到2030年，AI基礎設施的投資將達5.2兆美元，但貝恩(Bain)估計，該產業需要2兆美元的年營收才能支撐此等級的投資。OpenAI約130億美元的預估銷售額，突顯了此一鴻溝。將真正的終端用戶變現仍難以實現，只有5%的ChatGPT用戶付費訂閱服務。更關鍵的是，只有不到15%的企業AI試點計畫能轉入全面生產，因為大多數公司尚未實現顯著、可衡量的生產力提升。幾年前預測的、由AI驅動的大規模裁員尚未實現，進一步表明該技術的經濟效益尚未被大規模地實現。對台灣而言，此一差距將直接轉化為訂單的波動性。晶圓製造和組裝依賴於長達數季的能見度，如果美國客戶為了使資本支出與實際營收保持一致而暫停投資，台灣的出貨量將在美國股市反映經濟放緩之前就已下滑。資料來源：Bain, McKinsey其次，此資本與營收的不平衡延伸至實體基礎設施，特別是能源。光是OpenAI的「星際之門」(Stargate)專案就需要23千兆瓦(GW)的電力——約等於23座核反應爐的發電量。在台灣，經濟部能源署預計到2030年，工業用電需求將持續增長，主要由晶圓廠和資料中心所驅動。此一壓力勢必導致電價調整，即使全球AI需求依然強勁，上升的電力成本將壓縮製造利潤，並對ESG的目標構成挑戰。資料來源: The Guardian, Data Center Dynamics, ess.re最後，儘管AI龍頭企業現金充裕，但其財務實力卻有著系統性風險。與由債務驅動的網路泡沫不同，微軟(Microsoft)、亞馬遜(Amazon)、Google和輝達(Nvidia)等公司，每年超過2,000億美元的自由現金流，它們自我融通AI擴張的能力延長了此一週期，但也使台灣的供應鏈高度依賴少數關鍵參與者的支出決策。台積電(TSMC)的前五大美國客戶已佔其營收的60%以上。即使其中僅有一家放緩，也可能降低多個製程節點的晶圓廠產能利用率。資料來源：TSMC歷史表明，此類的過度建設往往為未來的生產力播下種子。1990年代的光纖網路和2010年代的太陽能產能都遵循了相同的模式：初期的泡沫留下了有用的基礎設施。台灣的角色與此類似。在今日的熱情下建立的硬體基礎，將成為AI主流階段的基石。投資的要點並非預測崩盤的時機，而是去預判此一轉變——從投機性的資本支出，轉向商業化變現的部署，其標誌正是生產力的普遍提升，從而證明大規模投資的合理性。與網路泡沫的差異然而，一些關鍵的差異將此AI週期與網路泡沫區分開來。2000年的泡沫建立在債務和疲弱的資產負債表之上。今日的AI巨頭——微軟(Microsoft)、Google、亞馬遜(Amazon)和輝達(Nvidia)——現金充裕，合計每年產生2,000億美元的自由現金流，並能從內部為擴張提供資金。回到2000年，像世界通訊(WorldCom)和環球電訊(Global Crossing)等公司大量借貸來建設它們無法填滿的網絡。當信貸市場緊縮時，違約在整個行業中引發了連鎖反應。而當今的企業即使明天削減支出，仍能保持獲利。另一個區別是資產的有形性。光纖泡沫留下了未被充分利用的電纜；AI熱潮則正在建設充滿可重複使用晶片和電力基礎設施的、全球分佈的資料中心。其利用率很高：資料中心的空置率低於5%，而運算需求仍然供不應求。此一建設雖具侵略性，卻是為了應對可見的使用量——而非純粹的投機。AI基礎設施正以接近滿載的狀態運行，與2000年代初閒置的光纖網路不同。資料來源：JPMorgan至關重要的是，商業化變現已在進行中。雲端巨頭從AI雲端工作負載、廣告優化和生產力工具中賺取實際收入。輝達(Nvidia)的晶片銷售代表著有形的需求，而不僅僅是炒作。瓶頸不在於採用率，而在於電力供應——這與2000年代初空蕩蕩的伺服器機櫃是完全不同的問題。另一個關鍵的區別在於估值。儘管偏高，但今日的估值錨定在一個2000年時普遍缺乏的、真實盈餘與現金流的基礎上。在1990年代末，像思科(Cisco)和甲骨文(Oracle)等領先的網路股，其預估本益比(forward P/E)超過60倍，許多未獲利的公司則以「眼球數」或「點擊率」等投機性指標進行估值。今日，AI龍頭股的預估本益比約在35倍左右。更重要的是，今日本益比中的「E」(盈餘)，代表著符合一般公認會計原則(GAAP)的龐大利潤。市場並非為從零開始的無限增長定價，而是在一個既有龐大且獲利的基礎上，實現強勁增長而定價。資料來源：Forbes, Yahoo Finance對台灣而言，此一區別至關重要。在2000年，網路泡沫幾乎未觸及台灣的出口產業。而今日台灣則處於AI價值鏈的核心，台積電(TSMC)、日月光(ASE)、緯創(Wistron)和廣達(Quanta)都扮演著關鍵角色。同樣的的循環，在虛增美國估值的同時，也直接驅動了台灣的出口盈餘。即使泡沫修正，實體的基礎設施——晶圓廠、工具和人才——依然存在。簡言之，AI可能正處於泡沫之中，但它並非建立在虛無飄渺之上。危險不在於資不抵債，而在於估值過高。當預期重新設定時，即使基礎技術持續進步，股價也可能急遽下跌。網路泡沫以崩盤告終，但它也為我們奠定了數位經濟的基礎。AI很可能正遵循同樣的劇本——只是這一次，台灣的半導體產業是主角之一。為台灣投資者剖析的觀點台灣處於投機性金融與實體生產的交匯點。作為AI硬體骨幹的角色，確保了其近期的盈餘動能，卻也放大了週期性風險。近期的好處是實質可見的：更高的工廠利用率和創紀錄的出貨量。中期的風險也同樣清晰：能源壓力、產能過剩，以及對少數全球客戶的依賴。對成熟的投資者而言，關鍵在於為週期性轉變進行佈局，而非僅僅著眼於長期趨勢。此一框架包含：因此，對投資者而言，目標是追求清晰度，而非預測。需要監控的關鍵問題是，資本流動何時能變得自我維持，而非自我參照。那個轉折點，即AI需求反映的是真正的生產力提升，而非循環的資金時，將標誌著台灣科技經濟下一個結構性的躍進。📲加入我們的專屬頻道，即可獲取我們的跨資產趨勢信念矩陣，以及專家嚴選的投資內容。💬透過LINE與我們聯繫，即可加入社群。👥在Facebook上私訊我們，即可加入社群。如果您覺得這份研究有價值：👍為這篇文章按讚。📰追蹤此部落格，獲取最新的市場動態。➡️分享給其他關注美股和台股市場的投資者。本電子報僅供參考，不構成任何證券或資產類別的投資建議或買賣推薦。文中所表達的觀點為作者截至發布日期的觀點，如有變動，恕不另行通知。所呈現的資訊乃基於從相信可靠的來源所獲取的數據，但其準確性、完整性和及時性不作保證。過往表現並非未來結果的指標。投資涉及風險，包括可能損失本金。讀者在做出任何投資決策前，應諮詢其財務顧問。作者及相關實體可能持有本文所討論的資產或資產類別的部位。Is AI’s Circular Financing Inflating a Bubble?Companies at the center of the AI boom have been investing billions of dollars in each other. This has led some to question whether AI's circular financing is sustainable.Joe 盧, CFA | 2025-10-26Executive SummaryCircular financing among U.S. hyperscalers drives the AI expansion, inflating growth metrics without corresponding end-user demand.Taiwan's semiconductor and data-center supply chains benefit from this capital but are exposed to significant risk if U.S. AI investments slow.Massive AI infrastructure spending and rising power demand strain both U.S. and Taiwan energy systems, compressing manufacturer margins.Taiwan’s export dependence on a few U.S. hyperscalers creates high concentration risk that strong corporate balance sheets cannot fully mitigate.Monitoring AI capex momentum, Taiwan export orders, and energy costs is essential for investors to distinguish speculative excess from sustainable structural growth.AI is driving one of the largest capital cycles in modern history, fueled by a circular financing structure where firms like Nvidia, OpenAI, Oracle, Amazon, and Google act simultaneously as investor, supplier, and customer. This dynamic reinforces valuations and creates a capital loop that directly impacts Taiwan, the epicenter of global chip manufacturing, translating into record exports but also mounting exposure. This analysis explores the parallels and differences between the current AI boom and the dot-com bubble, assessing whether these capital flows will evolve into sustainable growth or collapse under their own leverage, with a focus on the implications for Taiwan's semiconductor industry.The Self-Funding Artificial Intelligence MachineThree firms define the current loop: Nvidia, OpenAI, and Oracle. Nvidia invests up to US$100 billion in OpenAI. OpenAI spends that money to buy Nvidia chips. Oracle, which provides OpenAI with US$300 billion in cloud services, buys tens of billions of dollars of Nvidia GPUs to fulfill that contract.Each company reports higher revenue and rising stock prices, but the same capital circulates within a closed system. Bloomberg describes Nvidia as “the central bank of AI,” extending liquidity to keep the boom going.This structure mirrors the vendor financing of the 1990s telecom boom, though AI spending is largely funded by internal cash flow rather than debt. Still, these relationships make revenue appear stronger than it is, as capital circulates within a closed network instead of originating from end users, inflating perceived demand across the AI supply chain. This pattern resembles post-war Japan’s keiretsu or Korea’s chaebol, where cross-ownership ensured supply stability but also obscured financial risk.Taiwan sits directly under this capital loop. TSMC fabricates Nvidia’s GPUs, ASE packages them, and Wistron, Quanta, and Inventec assemble the AI servers that Oracle and Amazon deploy. Each new contract between U.S. hyperscalers sends a wave of orders through Taiwan’s factories, but also ties their revenue to the same set of financing cycles. This loop explains why Taiwan’s monthly semiconductor exports reached record highs even as AI monetization lagged. It also explains the vulnerability: if global financing tightens, the same loop can unwind, pulling Taiwan’s shipments down before U.S. equities reflect the slowdown.The AI Cycle's Fragile FoundationThe AI boom is built on a fragile foundation, with three core vulnerabilities that investors must monitor: the gap between capital intensity and monetization, the physical constraint of energy, and the high concentration of risk within the supply chain.The primary vulnerability is the imbalance between spending and income. McKinsey projects a $5.2 trillion in AI infrastructure investment by 2030, yet Bain estimates the sector needs $2 trillion in annual revenue to justify that level. OpenAI’s estimated US$13 billion in sales highlights this chasm. Real end-user monetization remains elusive. Only five percent of ChatGPT users pay for subscriptions. More critically, fewer than 15% of corporate AI pilots transition to full production because most companies have yet to realize significant, measurable productivity gains. The widespread, AI-driven layoffs predicted just a few years ago have not materialized, further indicating that the technology’s economic benefits are not yet being captured at scale. For Taiwan, this gap translates directly into order volatility. Fabrication and assembly rely on multi-quarter visibility, and if U.S. customers pause to align capex with real revenue, Taiwan’s shipments will decline before the U.S. stock market prices in the slowdown.Source: Bain, McKinseySecond, this capital-revenue imbalance extends to physical infrastructure, particularly energy. OpenAI’s “Stargate” project alone targets 23 gigawatts of power capacity—roughly the output of 23 nuclear reactors. In Taiwan, the Bureau of Energy projects a 70% growth in industrial electricity demand by 2030, largely driven by fabs and data centers. This strain necessitates tariff adjustments, and rising power costs will compress fabrication margins and challenge ESG mandates, even if global AI demand remains strong.Source: The Guardian, Data Center Dynamics, ree.esFinally, while today’s AI leaders are cash-rich, their financial strength concentrates systemic risk. Unlike the debt-fueled dot-com boom, firms like Microsoft, Amazon, Google, and Nvidia generate more than US$200 billion in annual free cash flow. Their capacity to self-fund the AI expansion extends the cycle but also makes Taiwan’s supply chain highly dependent on the spending decisions of a few key players. TSMC’s top five U.S. customers already represent over 60% of its revenue. A slowdown from even one of them could reduce fab utilization across multiple process nodes.Source: TSMCHistory shows that such overbuilding often seeds future productivity. The fiber-optic networks of the 1990’s and the solar capacity of the 2010’s followed the same pattern: initial bubbles that left behind useful infrastructure. Taiwan’s role is similar. The hardware base built under today’s exuberance will become the foundation for AI’s mainstream phase. The investment takeaway is not to time a collapse but to anticipate the transition—from speculative capex to monetized deployment, marked by the widespread evidence of productivity gains that justify the massive investment.Differences From the Dot-Com BubbleHowever, critical differences distinguish this AI cycle from the dot-com bubble. The 2000 bubble was built on debt and weak balance sheets. Today’s AI giants—Microsoft, Google, Amazon, and Nvidia—are flush with cash, generating a combined US$200 billion in annual free cash flow, and can fund expansion internally. Back in 2000, companies like WorldCom and Global Crossing borrowed heavily to build networks they couldn’t fill. When credit markets tightened, defaults cascaded across the industry. Today’s players could cut spending tomorrow and remain profitable.Another distinction is the tangibility of assets. The fiber-optic bubble left behind underused cables; the AI boom is building globally distributed data centers filled with reusable chips and power infrastructure. Utilization is high: data-center vacancy rates are below 5%, and compute demand still exceeds supply. The buildout, while aggressive, is responding to visible usage—not pure speculation.AI infrastructure is running near full capacity, unlike the idle fiber-optic networks of the early 2000sSource: JPMorganCrucially, monetization is already underway. Hyperscalers earn real income from AI cloud workloads, advertising optimization, and productivity tools. Nvidia’s chip sales represent tangible demand, not just hype. The bottleneck is not adoption but power supply—an entirely different problem from the empty server racks of the early 2000s.A key distinction also lies in valuation metrics. While elevated, today’s valuations are anchored to a foundation of real earnings and cash flow that was largely absent in 2000. In the late 1990s, leading internet stocks like Cisco and Oracle traded at forward P/E ratios exceeding 60x, with many unprofitable firms valued on speculative metrics like "eyeballs" or "clicks." Today, the AI leaders trade closer to 35x forward earnings. More importantly, the "E" in today's P/E represents substantial, GAAP-compliant profits. The market is not pricing in infinite growth from zero; it is pricing in strong growth from an already massive and profitable base.Sources: Forbes, Yahoo FinanceFor Taiwan, this distinction matters. In 2000, the internet bubble barely touched the island’s export sector. Today, Taiwan sits at the core of the AI value chain, with TSMC, ASE, Wistron, and Quanta all playing critical roles. The same feedback loop that inflates U.S. valuations directly drives Taiwan’s export earnings. Even if the bubble corrects, the physical infrastructure—fabs, tools, and talent—remains.In short, AI may be in a bubble, but it is not built on vapor. The danger is not insolvency—it is overvaluation. When expectations reset, stock prices could fall sharply even as the underlying technology keeps advancing. The internet bubble ended in a crash, but it also gave us the foundation for the digital economy. AI is likely following the same script—only this time, Taiwan’s semiconductor industry is one of the main characters.The Investor Lens for TaiwanTaiwan sits at the intersection of speculative finance and real production. The island’s role as the hardware backbone of AI ensures near-term earnings momentum but magnifies cyclical risk. The near-term benefit is tangible: higher factory utilization and record shipments. The medium-term risk is also clear: energy strain, overcapacity, and dependency on a few global customers.For sophisticated investors, the key is to position for cyclical shifts rather than just the secular trend. A framework for this includes:The AI cycle’s circular financing has lifted Taiwan’s exports and valuations but also tied them tightly to the spending behavior of a few U.S. giants. As these financing loops inevitably tighten, Taiwan will feel the turn first—through export orders, power demand, and valuation shifts.The objective for investors, therefore, is clarity, not prediction. The key question to monitor is when capital flows become self-sustaining rather than self-referential. That turning point, where AI demand reflects genuine productivity gains instead of recycled funding, will mark the next structural advance for Taiwan’s technology economy.📲Join our private channels to gain access to our cross-asset Trend Conviction Matrix and expert-curated investment content.💬Connect with us on LINE to join the group.👥Message us on Facebook to join the group.if you found this research valuable:👍'Like' this post.📰Follow this blog for new market updates.➡️Share it with others who track U.S. and Taiwan markets.This newsletter is provided for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to buy or sell any security or asset class. The views expressed are those of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. Information presented is based on data obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but its accuracy, completeness, and timeliness are not guaranteed. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Investing involves risks, including the possible loss of principal. Readers should consult with their own financial advisors before making any investment decisions. The author and associated entities may hold positions in the assets or asset classes discussed herein.立即加入《Joe’s 華爾街脈動》LINE@官方帳號，獲得最新專欄資訊（點此加入）關於《Joe’s 華爾街脈動》鉅亨網特別邀請到擁有逾 22 年美國投資圈資歷、CFA 認證的機構操盤人 Joseph Lu 擔任專欄主筆。Joe 為台裔美國人，曾管理超過百億美元規模的基金資產，並為總資產高達數千億美元的多家頂級金融機構提供資產配置優化建議。Joe 目前帶領著由美國頂尖大學教授與博士組成的精英團隊，透過獨家開發的 "趨勢脈動 TrendFolios® 指標"，為台灣投資人深度解析全球市場脈動，提供美股市場第一手專業觀點，協助投資人掌握先機。