受關稅戰的影響，全球很多產業鏈正岌岌可危，原本緊密聯動的製造網路面臨斷鏈風險加劇、佈局被迫調整、成本不斷攀升的困境，全球產業鏈數十年形成的平衡被打破，有些產業鏈的紊亂態勢已經逐步顯現。事實上，當下，全球產業正在經歷第五次轉移浪潮。從基本流向來看，與前四次由發達國家向開發中國家的單向轉移不同，這次轉移呈現出顯著的雙向流動趨勢。一方面，勞動密集型產業正在從中國內地向中西部地區、東南亞及非洲等勞動力成本較低的地區轉移。另一方面，一部分高技術企業和產業鏈的高端環節正在向發達國家和地區回流。從投資資料來看，亞洲發展中經濟體仍然是全球外資流入的主要目的地，佔全球FDI（外國直接投資）總額的40%，雖然FDI總額同比下降3%，但流入東盟的FDI增長顯著，以10%的增幅達到2250億美元，創下歷史新高。與此同時，2024年歐洲吸引的FDI暴跌58%，北美逆勢增長23%，非洲增長75%。值得注意的是，迪拜接收中國市場的FDI資金達34.2億美元，同比增長了200%以上。雖然各大產業鏈經歷斷鏈，但重構機遇也在顯現。在各國政府與企業應對、博弈的過程中，新的格局正在產生，也將形成新的生態圈和利益平衡，大量資金將流向高價值的產業和環節。Tariff wars have left many global industrial chains precarious. Once tightly linked manufacturing networks face higher disruption risks, forced layout tweaks and rising costs, breaking the balance built over decades and revealing disorder in some chains.In fact, the world is now in the fifth wave of industrial transfer. Unlike the previous four one-way shifts from developed to developing countries, this one shows a clear two-way trend. Labor-intensive industries are moving from China’s mainland to lower-cost areas (China’s central/western regions, Southeast Asia, Africa), while some high-tech firms and high-end chain links are flowing back to developed economies.By investment data: Asian developing economies remain the top FDI destination, taking 40% of the global total. Despite a 3% year-on-year drop in global FDI, ASEAN’s inflow rose 10% to a record $225 billion. In 2024, Europe’s FDI plummeted 58%, North America grew 23% against the trend, and Africa 75%. Notably, Dubai’s FDI from China hit $3.42 billion, up over 200% year-on-year.While major chains have seen disruptions, reconstruction opportunities are emerging. As governments and enterprises respond and compete, a new pattern, ecosystem and interest balance will take shape, with massive capital flowing to high-value industries and links.整體來看，越南、印度、墨西哥是本輪產業轉移的最大受益者，東南亞正成為電子製造的新樞紐。2025年，越南電子出口額同比增長37%，三星、富士康等巨頭將30%的智慧型手機產能從中國轉移至越南。雖然越南的勞動力成本僅為中國的1/3，但其人口不足中國的8%，基礎設施薄弱，難以承接更高端產業鏈。印度在試圖複製中國模式，憑藉勞動力成本優勢吸引勞動密集型產業，但核心零部件仍高度依賴中國進口。而且，營商環境極不穩定，勞資矛盾尖銳。2024年，三星在印度的工廠就曾因工人罷工導致產能暴跌75%。墨西哥與東歐成為區域配套樞紐，特別是墨西哥成為了北美市場近岸配套基地。2025年，墨西哥承接了20%的中國家電和汽車產能，中資企業在墨數量超2000家，特斯拉、比亞迪等車企加速建廠。但是墨西哥電價、物流成本相對較高，且過度依賴美國市場，存在一定政策性風險。而東歐承接了德國汽車零部件、電子裝置等產能，波蘭、捷克的區域產業鏈協同度也在提升，成為歐洲製造體系的重要延伸。中國正在從世界工廠轉型為全球創新中心。中低端勞動密集型產業出現外遷，但是在高端製造領域的競爭力不斷增強。2025年，半導體產業在製造環節保持優勢，並向上游設計、裝置領域加速拓展，相關企業技術突破推動國產化率提升至42%。新能源汽車領域龍頭企業佔據全球市場主導地位。與此同時，中西部地區成為產業轉移的新高地。四川、重慶承接了東部地區的部分產能，利用土地低成本優勢打造內陸製造中心。內蒙古也通過產業轉移大力發展新能源裝備、智能算力等領域。Overall, Vietnam, India and Mexico benefit most from this industrial shift; Southeast Asia is emerging as a new electronics hub. In 2025, Vietnam’s electronics exports rose 37% YoY, with Samsung and Foxconn moving 30% of their smartphone capacity there from China. Though its labor cost is 1/3 of China’s, Vietnam’s small population (8% of China’s) and weak infrastructure limit its ability to take high-end chains.India tries to replicate China’s model, attracting labor-intensive industries with low labor costs, but relies heavily on China for core components. Its business environment is unstable and labor conflicts are acute – Samsung’s Indian factory saw 75% capacity drop due to strikes in 2024.Mexico and Eastern Europe are regional supporting hubs: Mexico is a nearshore base for North America, taking 20% of China’s home appliance and auto capacity in 2025, with over 2,000 Chinese firms and faster factory builds by Tesla/BYD. However, it faces high electricity/logistics costs, over-reliance on the US and policy risks. Eastern Europe undertakes German auto parts/electronics capacity, with Poland and Czech seeing higher chain synergy as an extension of Europe’s manufacturing system.China is shifting from "world factory" to global innovation center. Mid/low-end labor-intensive industries are moving out, but its high-end manufacturing competitiveness grows. In 2025, its semiconductor sector retains manufacturing advantages and expands upstream (design, equipment), with localization rate hitting 42% via tech breakthroughs. Leading NEV firms dominate the global market. Meanwhile, central/western China becomes a new transfer hub: Sichuan and Chongqing take eastern capacity to build inland manufacturing centers with low land costs; Inner Mongolia develops new energy equipment and smart computing power via transfers.1. 半導體產業美國通過《晶片法案》提供超300億美元補貼，推動台積電、英特爾等企業將晶圓製造產能向美國轉移，2025年美國半導體製造業產值預計突破1800億美元。與此同時，東南亞崛起成為新的製造中心，新加坡重點發展晶圓代工等前道工藝，馬來西亞專注封測等後道環節。日本與印度達成晶片、顯示器件、太陽能裝置等領域的產能轉移計畫，以降低對中國供應鏈的依賴。而中國則通過“反內卷”政策推動產業升級，將半導體裝置國產化率提升至42%，相關企業在打破壟斷。2. 機床與機器人產業全球機床產業正在被德日壟斷高端市場，而中國在突圍中端市場。日本山崎馬扎克、德國通快等企業佔據全球市場份額的17%，而中國海天精工、北京精雕等企業在中端市場實現突破，並逐步向高端領域延伸。同時，中國成為機器人領域的全球最大市場，2025年工業機器人密度達398台/萬人，但核心零部件如減速器、伺服電機仍依賴進口，技術自主可控成為下一階段競爭的關鍵。3. 鋰電池產業2025年，全球鋰電需求以26%的年複合增長率擴張，中國佔據製造中心地位，但產業鏈正向歐美和東南亞雙向轉移。歐美通過《歐盟電池與廢電池法規》等政策，推動企業本土化生產。印度尼西亞等東南亞國家憑藉鎳資源優勢、土地及勞動力成本優勢，吸引鋰電池前驅體及正極環節投資，引導產業落地。而中國通過技術和成本優勢應對挑戰，寧德時代、隆基綠能等企業在海外建廠，同時加大固態電池、氫能等前沿技術研發，鞏固全球領先地位。2025年，中國電子行業金屬再利用率提升至60%，可再生能源在製造業中的佔比達35%。1. Semiconductor Industry. The US offers over $30 billion in subsidies via the CHIPS Act, luring TSMC and Intel to shift wafer manufacturing capacity there; its semiconductor manufacturing output is expected to exceed $180 billion in 2025. Meanwhile, Southeast Asia emerges as a new hub – Singapore focuses on front-end processes like wafer foundry, Malaysia on back-end ones like packaging/testing. Japan and India launch capacity transfer plans in chips, displays and solar equipment to reduce reliance on China’s supply chain. China promotes industrial upgrading via "anti-involution" policies, lifting semiconductor equipment localization rate to 42%, with enterprises breaking monopolies.2. Machine Tool & Robot Industry. Germany and Japan monopolize the global high-end machine tool market, while China breaks through the mid-end. Japan’s Mazak and Germany’s Trumpf hold 17% of the global market; China’s Haitian Precision and Beijing Jingdiao make mid-end breakthroughs and extend to high-end. China is also the world’s largest robot market – its industrial robot density reaches 398 units per 10,000 people in 2025, but core components (reducers, servo motors) still rely on imports, making independent technology the key to next-stage competition.3. Lithium Battery Industry. Global lithium battery demand expands at a 26% CAGR in 2025; China leads in manufacturing, but the industrial chain shifts bidirectionally to Europe, the US and Southeast Asia. Europe and the US push local production via policies like the EU Battery Regulation. Southeast Asian countries (e.g., Indonesia) attract investment in lithium battery precursors and cathodes with nickel resources, low land and labor costs. China responds with tech and cost advantages: CATL and Longi build overseas factories, and boost R&D in solid-state batteries and hydrogen energy to consolidate leadership. In 2025, China’s electronics industry metal recycling rate hits 60%, and renewable energy accounts for 35% of manufacturing energy use.面對關稅衝擊引發的斷鏈和紊亂，各國政府與企業都在積極應對，不斷重構新的產業鏈生態。各國政府在通過政策引導產業鏈穩定的同時，也在藉機重構國際規則。例如中國通過完善出口管制體系維護自身權益，同時積極推動與“一帶一路”國家的產能合作，2025年對東盟、拉美國家的出口占比較2020年已經提升15%。歐盟通過碳邊境調節機制（CBAM）建構綠色貿易規則，將環境成本納入產業鏈佈局考量，間接避險傳統關稅影響。跨國企業摸索出“多點佈局”策略，通過在不同區域設定生產基地與供應商網路，降低對單一市場的依賴。一是提前鎖貨關鍵零件，通過長期協議鎖定供應鏈穩定性，降低關稅印發的斷供風險；二是升級本地組裝，將高關稅成品拆解為低關稅零部件進口，並在目標市場完成組裝，以此來降低關稅成本；三是價值鏈本地化，通過在不同國家分別進行設計、研發、生產，提升當地價值鏈佔比，在規避關稅的同時貼近市場需求，進而提升利潤水平。從全球佈局來看，關稅戰客觀上加速了全球供應鏈的區域整合，亞洲、北美、歐洲三大經濟圈內部的協同度正在顯著提升。亞洲區域憑藉工業門類齊全、勞動力素質高、基礎設施完善的優勢，促使供應鏈協同更加緊密，像中日韓的技術研發、東南亞的生產製造與中國的供應鏈整合能力形成互補。北美依託《美墨加協定》形成“美國研發+墨加製造”的近岸體系。歐洲通過中東歐承接配套產能，提升區域內產業鏈協同度來應對關稅風險。 Facing chain disruptions from tariff shocks, governments and businesses worldwide are reshaping industrial chain ecosystems. Governments use policies to stabilize chains while revising global rules: China has strengthened export controls and boosted capacity cooperation with BRI countries, with exports to ASEAN and Latin America up 15% in 2025 vs 2020; the EU uses CBAM to build green trade rules, factoring environmental costs into layouts to offset tariffs.Multinational firms adopt a "multi-location" strategy, with bases and suppliers across regions to reduce single-market reliance: 1) Lock key parts via long-term deals; 2) Upgrade local assembly (import low-tariff components, assemble locally); 3) Localize value chains (design/R&D/production in different countries) to avoid tariffs, meet demand and boost profits.Globally, tariff wars have accelerated regional supply chain integration, raising synergy in Asia, North America and Europe. Asia leverages complete industries, skilled labor and good infrastructure (R&D in China/Japan/South Korea, manufacturing in Southeast Asia, complemented by China’s integration capacity). North America forms "US R&D + Mexico/Canada manufacturing" via USMCA. Europe uses Central/Eastern Europe for supporting capacity to enhance regional synergy against tariff risks. (無界社 Economic Views)
