導語在外部環境動盪的背景下,中國2025年仍實現官方增長目標。2026年1月19日中國官方資料顯示,GDP增長5%,但人口下降快於預期。增長的結果延續慣性,但以不同尋常的方式實現目標:出口韌性與創紀錄貿易順差成為關鍵支撐。出口順差接近1.2兆美元,即便此前處於與美國的關稅摩擦之中。出口強勁彌補內需不足,消費端並未被提振。政府強調擴大消費,但居民並未增加支出。儲蓄率從2024年的31.7%升至2025年的32%。這並不意味著消費需求已經飽和。國家統計局局長康義指出,中國每100戶家庭僅有53輛私人汽車,而美國擁有197輛汽車及其他“輕型車輛”。這表明消費潛力仍在,但中國人民的現實選擇是繼續儲蓄。投資端出現罕見分裂,官方口徑之間形成明顯矛盾。固定資產投資在2025年出現1989年以來首次收縮。房地產投資下滑延續,基礎設施投資下降,製造業投資增速僅0.6%。合併結果之差,以至於部分經濟學家不願照單全收。另一官方口徑“資本形成總額”卻顯示資本開支仍在增長,但增速偏慢。康義稱投資對全年增長貢獻0.75個百分點,約佔總增量七分之一。若這一說法成立,投資需以實際口徑增長約2%。差異可能來自技術口徑。固定資產投資未做通膨調整。統計範圍與處理方式也與資本形成總額不同。文中還提到可能包含對過往高估的修正。內需弱與供給強並存,結構性矛盾外溢為貿易摩擦。外部市場繼續吸收國內難以消化的產出。貿易夥伴對商品衝擊的擔憂上升。墨西哥對1400多種、來自其貿易協定之外國家的商品加征最高50%關稅。清單涵蓋汽車零部件、玩具、牙線和撲克牌等。中國是主要對象。巨額順差與通縮環境下的真實匯率走弱被視為出口優勢來源,也被批評為加劇外部失衡。需求偏軟與持續通縮使中國商品價格相對海外價格下降。按相對價格調整後,真實匯率在2022年3月至2025年7月間走弱超過18%。出口因此更便宜。IMF總裁格奧爾基耶娃指出,這一變化在提升出口競爭力的同時也在加劇外部失衡。中國開始釋放安撫訊號。措施包括降低出口相關稅收優惠力度。中國與歐盟就對歐電動汽車出口設定最低價底線達成初步協議。加拿大總理馬克·卡尼訪華期間,中國同意下調對加拿大油菜籽關稅。中國還對龍蝦、螃蟹和豌豆等給予報復性關稅豁免,期限至少九個月。人民幣階段性走強提供緩衝,但可能加劇內部通縮壓力。中美在2025年中期關稅休戰後,人民幣按貿易加權口徑走強。聯準會轉向更鴿派強化了這一趨勢。2025年末人民幣對美元一度升破7,為2023年以來首次。更強匯率可能安撫貿易夥伴並縮小外部失衡。它也可能強化通縮壓力並惡化內部矛盾。政策出路被指向更強財政刺激與社會保障改革。花旗的余向榮認為需要進一步財政刺激,並改革社會保障網。財政刺激將抬升支出,從而推高增長與通膨。國內價格回升會推高真實匯率。文章指出,這與通縮壓低真實匯率的機制相反。IMF同樣支援通過財政與貨幣政策促進向國內消費轉型。1月19日,IMF首席經濟學家古蘭沙強調,應更多投入於房地產部門出清,減少製造業補貼,以推動再平衡。最後,增長目標的實現呈現慣性,但實現路徑可能違背預期。2025年的意外在於出口強勢。2026年的意外可能來自政策取向的變化。文章認為,中國或許應考慮改變過度依賴外部需求的增長結構,實現可增長的可持續性。China hits its GDP target—in a weird wayStrong exports make up for weak investmentJan 19th 2026In a chaotic world, China did the predictable thing. Its economy met the official growth target for 2025, according to figures released on January 19th, just as it had the year before and the year before that. GDP grew by 5%, although China’s population fell even faster than forecast. Growth was boosted by a record trade surplus, which reached almost $1.2trn, despite the country’s tariff war with America (see chart 1).The unexpected strength of China’s exports last year made up for the weakness of other sources of spending. The government had set itself the task of “vigorously boosting consumption”, but households did not play along. They saved an even higher share of their income in 2025 (32%) than they had the year before (31.7%). It is not as if Chinese consumers already possess all that their hearts could desire. In a press conference, Kang Yi, head of the National Bureau of Statistics, pointed out that China has just 53 private cars for every 100 households. America has 197 cars and other “light-duty” vehicles.China has usually relied on investment spending to keep its economy humming. But according to the official figures, fixed-asset investment (FAI) shrank in 2025 for the first time since 1989 (see chart 2). The slump in property investment continued, accompanied by a decline in infrastructure spending and negligible growth (0.6%) in manufacturing investment. The combined figure is so awful that many economists refuse to take it at face value.Another official measure of investment, gross capital formation, suggests that capital spending continued to expand, albeit slowly, last year. Investment accounted for 0.75 percentage points of China’s overall growth, a seventh of the total, according to Mr Kang. For that to be true, investment must have increased by about 2% in real terms. Some of the glaring gap between the two statistics may reflect technical differences. FAI is not adjusted for inflation, and the authorities may also be trying to correct for overstatements in the past.China’s weak domestic demand and strong supply stand in prominent “contradiction”, noted Mr Kang. To resolve that contradiction, the superpower still relies on foreigners to buy all the stuff it cannot sell at home. Some of China’s trading partners, however, are losing patience, fearful that the flood of Chinese goods will wipe out their own industries. Mexico, for example, began the year by instituting tariffs of up to 50% on over 1,400 goods, including car parts, toys, dental floss and even playing cards, from countries outside its trade agreements, with China chief among them.The trillion-dollar surplus has also drawn renewed attention to what many see as China’s trump card, its tightly managed exchange rate. Thanks to soft demand and persistent deflation, the prices of China’s goods have fallen relative to prices elsewhere. Adjusted for this shift, China’s exchange rate weakened by more than 18% between March 2022 and July 2025. This fall in the “real” (inflation-adjusted) exchange rate has made China’s exports cheaper, thereby “worsening external imbalances”, pointed out Kristalina Georgieva, head of the IMF, last month.This criticism may be starting to register with China’s leaders. They have begun to throw a few sops to the country’s trading partners, making tax breaks for exporters less generous, for example. China has also reached an initial agreement with the European Union to set floors under the prices of its exports of electric vehicles. During a visit to Beijing by Canada’s prime minister, Mark Carney, China agreed to cut tariffs on Canadian rapeseed (canola). It also agreed to exempt the country’s lobsters, crabs and peas from retaliatory tariffs for at least nine months.China has also allowed the yuan to strengthen a little. After the tariff truce with America in the middle of 2025, the currency began to rise on a trade-weighted basis. A dovish turn by America’s Federal Reserve has reinforced this trend. In the last days of 2025 the yuan moved below seven to the dollar for the first time since 2023 (see chart 3). A dearer exchange rate might mollify China’s trading partners, but it could also intensify China’s deflationary pressures. A stronger yuan would narrow the country’s external imbalance, the gap between its exports and imports, but worsen its internal imbalance.A possible response would be further fiscal stimulus, according to Xiangrong Yu of Citigroup, as well as reforms to strengthen China’s social safety-net. Fiscal stimulus would lift Chinese spending, contributing to both growth and inflation. The increase in Chinese prices at home would strengthen the real exchange rate, just as deflation has weakened it. Even the IMF is keen. “We strongly support the government coming up with fiscal and monetary policy measures…to support the shift towards more domestic consumption,” said Ms Georgieva last month.On January 19th the fund’s chief economist, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, urged China to rebalance the economy by spending more on cleaning up the property sector and less on manufacturing subsidies. China meets its growth target with monotonous predictability. But how it meets the target can defy expectations. Last year the strength of exports stunned everyone. This year China may have to spring a surprise by listening to the IMF instead. (IMI財經觀察)